

THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS



The Pro and Con Monthly

OCTOBER, 1929

Recent Efforts at Arms Limitation
The Coming Anglo-American Conference

Articles by

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Pro and Con Feature
Does Parity Lead to Limitation?

Regular Features



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
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The
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Digest**

October, 1929

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 **LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT** 

THE PRO AND CON FEATURE    ACTION BY HOUSE AND SENATE    LEGISLATIVE NEWS ITEMS

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The Limitation of Naval Armaments

Modern Efforts to Disarm
Steps Taken by the League of Nations
What America Has Done

The Hoover-MacDonald Moves
Plans for the Next Conference
The Issues at Stake

A Chronology of Modern Arms Limitation Efforts

1920—January 10. Treaty of Versailles entered into force, providing for German disarmament.

The League of Nations Covenant (Part I of the Treaty of Versailles) entered into force on same date: Article 8 and 9 of Covenant deal with the disarmament question.

1920—May 9. Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval, and Air Matters of the League organized in accordance with Article 9 of the Covenant. The Commission held twenty sessions up to the end of 1928.

1921—July 16 to 19. First session of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, set up as a result of a resolution of the First Assembly of

the League in 1920. This Commission held a total of ten sessions, the last in July, 1924.

1921—November 12 to February 6, 1922. Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament met at Washington.

1922—February 6. Signature of Treaty by the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, limiting naval armament. Signature of Treaty between the same Powers in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare. (This Treaty has not become effective.)

1922—December 2-12. Moscow Conference, Moscow,

Russia. Called by M. Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to discuss a scheme for mutual reduction of armaments in the states bordering on the Baltic Sea. Participated in by Russia, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

Russia announced her willingness to reduce her army to 200,000 in two years, and suggested proportional reduction by the Baltic states, as follows: Russia, 600,000 men; Finland, 22,000; Esthonia, 9,000; Latvia, 13,000; Lithuania, 27,000 and Poland, 214,000.

Reply was made that political disarmament was necessary, also that proportional disarmament would be disadvantageous for some smaller states; hence a joint scheme of arbitration was proposed.

A pact of non-aggression and agreement to use pacific means of settling disputes was discussed and agreed to, after amendment by Russia.

The Conference broke down December 12, because of Russia's refusal to give any political guarantee before reduction of armaments should be commenced.

1922—December 4, 1922, to February 7, 1923. Conference on Central American Affairs held at Washington on invitation of the United States. Countries participating were Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the United States, while not primarily a conference on limitation of armaments the agenda contained provisions for the discussion of:

"Measures whereby, in view of the achievements accomplished with regard to the limitation of armaments by the powers participating in the Conference at Washington in 1921, the Central American States may carry on this endeavor, and set an example to the world and above all to the powers of this hemisphere, by adopting effective measures for the limitation of armaments in Central America."

The Conference adopted a convention for the limitation of armaments, which covered standing armies, national guards, exportation and importation of arms and ammunition, war aircraft, gas and chemical warfare.

1923—March 23 to May 3. Fifth International Conference of American States, Santiago, Chile. Included in the agenda was:

"Consideration of the reduction and limitation of military and naval expenditures on some just and practicable basis."—Art. III.

A committee on limitation of armaments which included representatives of all the nations at the Conference reported a resolution for limitation of armaments which was considered and modified by the Conference, which adopted a resolution adhering generally to the provisions of the Five Power Pact adopted at Washington, February 6, 1922.

1923—July. League Council authorized publication by the League of the "Armament's Yearbook."

1924—February 14 to 25. Conference of Commission of Naval Experts at Rome, held under the auspices of the League of Nations. Permanent Advisory Committee on Military, Naval and Air Questions, held to consider applying the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 to non-signatory states, whether members of the League or not. Nations represented were: Belgium, Brazil, Czecho-Slovakia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, Argentine Republic, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway and Russia.

Work was merely preliminary and technical; discussion was confined to States owning capital ships, not including those owning none; the tonnage limits of non-signatory states were considered; and a report ordered prepared for the Council, summarizing the opinions of the different delegates. These results were later considered by the Council and transmitted to the States members and non-members of the League, with request for observations and suggestions concerning the desirability of convening another naval conference. Only Roumania, not invited to the Rome meeting, desired another conference; the others deemed it would be fruitless.

1924—April 26 to 29. First session of the League Committee of Experts on Private Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition and of Implements of War. Six sessions were held, the last in July, 1926.

1924—October 2. Opening for signature of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

1925—March 12. Rejection by British Government of Geneva Protocol. (Statement before League Council of British Representatives.)

1925—May 4 to June 17. Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War.

1925—June 17. Signature of Convention for the Supervision of International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. (Has not gone into effect to date.)

Signature of Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in war of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. (Goes into effect for each country upon date of ratification.)

1926—May 18 to 26. First session of Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, set up as a result of resolution of Sixth Assembly in 1925. Six sessions held to date, the last in April and May, 1929.

1927—March. First reading of Draft Convention on Disarmament by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

1927—March 14 to April 25. The first session of the Special Commission to prepare a Draft Convention on Private Manufacturing of Arms and Ammunition and of Implements of War. Four sessions to date, the last in August, 1929.

1927—June 20 to August 4. Conference on the Limitation of Armaments at Geneva. Initiated by the United States for the consideration of further limitation of naval armaments through the extension of the principles of the Washington Conference Treaties of 1922.

Nations represented: United States, Great Britain and the Dominions, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, Irish Free State, India; Japan, Italy, as an unofficial observer.

The Conference collapsed on account of differences over the question of cruiser strength. (See CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST for January, 1929.)

1928—September 28. Identical notes transmitted by the United States Government to the British and French Governments on the subject of naval disarmament.

What the League of Nations Has Done Toward Limitation of Armaments

Efforts Made at Geneva During Past Ten Years to Reduce Forces on Land and Sea

by DENYS P. MYERS

Director of Research, World Peace Foundation



HE members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

"The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments.

"Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every 10 years.

"After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council." (Covenant, Art. 8.)

From 1920 to 1928

Effort to make the prescribed agreement upon the reduction and limitation of armament has been continuous since 1920, but through 1928 had led to no general result. The point of view of the Members of the League had, however, undergone several important changes. They felt that the new approach to the problem had offered improved prospects of success in the near future.

In 1920 when the League began to function, states felt that the maintenance of armament was one of the most sacred functions of their independence. In the First Assembly they insisted, however, that the problem of reduction should be intrusted to the Temporary Mixed Commission so as to take it out of the hands of strictly military experts. In 1921, the Assembly urged this commission to make proposals in the form of a draft treaty. The commission found that a feeling of insecurity was the chief bar to reduction of armament. The Assembly in 1922 emphasized this thought in extensive resolutions, one of which—known as Resolution XIV—added that "moral disarmament is an essential preliminary condition of material disarmament, and that this moral disarmament can only be achieved in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and security."

The Draft Treaty of 1923

In 1923, the Temporary Mixed Commission reported a draft treaty of mutual assistance to the Assembly, in which the third committee, as a conference, perfected the text for submission to Governments. Eighteen states approved it in principle, but various criticisms were leveled against it, one of which was that it did not take into sufficient account existing machinery for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Premiers Edouard Herriot of France and J. Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain attended the opening sessions of the Assembly in 1924 as heads of their delegations. They were fresh from the London Conference on

Reparations, at which the Experts' (Dawes) Plan was brought into force and smooth working order by provisions for the establishment of 19 separate arbitral jurisdictions. As a result of their Assembly speeches, a resolution requested the First and Third Committees to examine the obligations of the Covenant "in relation to the guarantees of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of armaments may require." The result was the well-known Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, opened for signature October 2, 1924. This agreement was built on the basic conception that "There can be no arbitration or security without disarmament, nor can there be disarmament without arbitration and security." Its first aim was to supply a system of pacific settlement, made complete by closing the legal "fissures in the Covenant," and secondly to provide for the general disarmament conference which, it was planned, could be held in 1925.

Prime Minister Baldwin's Position

The British Government, under Premier Baldwin, held up the preparations for this conference, and its representative in the Council on March 12, 1925, declared himself against the principles of the protocol. His essential declaration was that the real problems of confidence was not to be solved by a general agreement but by agreements on certain "extreme cases," of "brooding fears that keep huge armaments in being." The best way of dealing with these, he said, "is, with the cooperation of the League, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs."

In February, 1925, Germany made the proposal that led to the Locarno Conference. The Locarno treaty of guaranty neutralizes the Rhine frontier, the principal of the "extreme cases." The other treaties resulting from the Conference provide for a complete system of pacific settlement between the parties concerned. This system was made completely effective by the admission of Germany to the League and by the entrance of the treaties into force in September, 1926. The Locarno principles then became a new starting point.

The Present Policy of the League

The early development of League policy respecting armament has, therefore, been based upon recognition of the fact that war occurs only as the result of disputes, for which there are but two methods of settlement: By armaments or peaceful means. Since 1926, the whole exploration of the subject has emphasized the pacific means of settling disputes in the belief that their development reduces the necessity for armament.

Various Proposals Submitted

In this connection extensive re-examinations of the

means of pacific settlement afforded by the Covenant itself have been made. A French proposal to the Preparatory Commission in 1926 requested investigation of methods which would "enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce the objects of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible." A committee of the Council drew up a report which was approved by the Assembly in 1926 and which lays down details of procedure under Art. 11 of the Covenant.

The Committee on Arbitration and Security brought into the Ninth Assembly in 1928 elaborate reports on the operations of Arts. 10, 11 and 16 of the Covenant.

Since 1926, pursuit of the solution of the armament problem has advanced along two main lines: (1) Preparation for a conference to reduce and limit armament in a technical sense, and (2) development of the system of pacific settlement with a view to solving the problem of security.

The Temporary Mixed Commission

The first Assembly in 1920 passed a resolution inviting the Council "to instruct a temporary commission composed of persons possessing the requisite competence in matters of a political, social and economic nature to prepare . . . reports and proposals for the reduction of armaments as provided for by Art. 8 of the Covenant." The Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, with the addition of seven civilian members in 1922, functioned until after the Fifth Assembly in 1924.

The Coordination Commission

The Coordination Commission succeeded it and continues to exist. This consists of the active Committee of the Council—The Council acting as a committee—and of what is separately called the Joint Commission to advise the Preparatory Commission on the economic aspect of questions. It consists of two members each of the Economic, Financial and Transit Organizations, two members of the Employers' Group and two members of the Workers' Group of the Governing Body of the International Labor Office, and four members competent to deal with questions connected with industry and transport.

The Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments

This commission is provided for in Art. 9 of the Covenant and was set up by the Council on May 9, 1920. It is made up of military, naval and air officers representing the Governments members of the council. The commission is divided into three subcommissions, one expert in each branch of armament, and its primary duty is to advise the Council on technical matters. It sits as Subcommission A of the Preparatory Commission with additional members.

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference

The Preparatory Commission was established by the Council September 26, 1925, and is composed of:

- (a) Representatives of states members of the Council;
- (b) Representatives of countries chosen among those which, by reason of their geographical situation, occupy a special position as regards the problem of disarmament and which are not otherwise represented on the commission;
- (c) Any state not represented on the commission to submit memoranda and to be heard on them;
- (d) States members of the Council since 1925, the Soviet Union, Turkey and the United States.

Preparation for Conference

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference began work in May, 1926, on the basis of finding replies to a series of seven elaborate questions drawn up by the Council on December 12, 1925, which summarized the study given to the subject in the previous six years. Several points were added in the commission and have given rise to subsidiary investigations.

By the end of 1926 the subcommissions had worked up replies and in March, 1927, the commission itself was able to make from this most impressively complicated series of answers and counter suggestions a synoptic analysis for further negotiation.

Limitation of Naval Cruisers

One of the subjects resulting in a fundamental difference was that of the principle by which to limit naval cruiser tonnage. Some states wanted a total tonnage fixed without specifying vessel size; others wanted the size of vessels fixed and the total tonnage determined. The United States attempted to solve this difficulty by inviting certain states to a Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments at Geneva, June 20-August 4, 1927. Great Britain and Japan attended officially, but it came to no conclusion because the United States and Great Britain were unable to compromise their views on respective requirements.

When the Preparatory Commission met the third time in March, 1927, it studied preliminary drafts of a convention and, with many questions still unsettled, passed a draft convention on first reading. To its November, 1927, session the Soviet delegation presented a project for complete and immediate disarmament. This was rejected at the session in March, 1928, after a lively debate, but is to be submitted in revised form at the next session.

Fundamental Points of Disagreement

The draft convention passed at the March meeting had served to bring out the fundamental points of disagreement between various conceptions of national needs for armament. Each great state is confronted by physical circumstances, peculiar to its situation, which affect its armament ideas. The small states in any case do not rely on armament. The points of disagreement, therefore, did not apply to all negotiators and a solution offered by those concerned with any point would probably prove acceptable to all others for the sake of making progress. It was that which prompted the American delegate in March, 1928, to ask: "Have we or have we not by direct negotiation or in any other way achieved a sufficient basis of agreement?" The answer was in the negative, so that the commission adjourned without putting the draft convention to a second reading.

The Briand-Kellogg Treaty

Meantime the Briand-Kellogg pact for the renunciation of war was under negotiation and its signing on August 27, 1928, at Paris—along with the simultaneous work of the Commission on Arbitration and Security—was changing the political conditions in which the armament problem was envisaged. For the fourth time in the Ninth Assembly the pressure of the small states and Germany was to increase their own security. The Assembly urged the differing Governments to seek "agreed solutions" without delay so that the work could succeed. It further called on the president of the Preparatory Commission

to "keep in contact with the Governments concerned so that he may be apprized of the progress of their negotiations" and could call the next session early in 1929.

Exchange of Information

The Covenant provides for several reforms in regard to armament in addition to reduction. Action has been taken on these phases of the problem.

The members of the League undertook in Art. 8 of the Covenant "to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." The Temporary Mixed Commission in 1922 and 1923 published much statistical information. In July, 1923, the Council, on the basis of the commission's investigations, authorized the Secretariat to begin publishing a yearbook embodying this information. The result of this authorization is the annual publication of the *Armaments Year-Book: General and Statistical Information*.

Trade in War Materials

An important phase of armament reduction is the proper control of international trade in war materials. Before the World War certain areas in Africa and Asia were subject to such control. The treaty of St. Germain of September 10, 1919, aimed to bring the previous arrangements up to date, but it was never brought into force owing to the declination of the United States to proceed with ratification. The Temporary Mixed Commission devoted much time to the question and eventually in February, 1924, was able to meet with representative of the United States and to draw up a new draft convention. The resulting conference was held at Geneva, May 4-June 17, 1925, with 45 states represented.

Traffic in Arms

The convention for the supervision of the international trade in arms and ammunition and in implements of war, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925, had not entered into force on December 31, 1928. The object of the convention is to establish a general system of supervision and publicity for the international trade in arms, munitions and implements of war, and a special system for areas where measures of this kind are generally recognized as particularly necessary.

Export and Import of Arms

Chap. I defines five categories to which the convention applies—arms of exclusive war utility, arms of possible war utility, war ships, aircraft, and other arms.

Chap. II lays down that Governments only shall have the right to export or import arms of exclusive war utility. Exceptions are contemplated in the case of manufacturers of war material and duly authorized rifle clubs or similar associations. Consignments for export of arms of war utility must be accompanied by a license or declaration of the importing Government and the regular publication of statistical returns must be made within two months of the close of each quarter. The trade in warships and aircraft is subject to publicity regulations only. The trade in other arms is free.

Land Zones Prescribed

Chap. III defines the system to be applied to special zones. These comprise:

- (a) A land zone consisting of the African Continent,

with the exception of Egypt, Lybia, Tunisia, Algeria, the Spanish possessions in North Africa, Abyssinia and the Union of South Africa, together with the territory under its mandate, and of Southern Rhodesia. This zone includes the adjacent islands situated within 100 marine miles from the coast; it includes further the Arabian Peninsula, Gwadar, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq;

The Maritime Zones

(b) A maritime zone, including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman.

To these zones the export of all arms save warships is forbidden unless the contracting party exercising sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection or tutelage over the territory is willing to admit the articles in question for lawful purposes.

Chap. IV contains three provisions of a special nature relating to Abyssinia, to the reservations which a certain number of countries bordering on Russia may wish to make owing to the non-adhesion of Russia, and to countries possessing extraterritorial jurisdiction in the territory of another state.

Chap. V lays down that the convention shall not apply to arms forwarded to the military forces of the exporting country, wherever these forces may be. It is also provided that in time of war, supervision and publicity, so far as consignment of arms to a belligerent is concerned shall be suspended.

Application of Internal Laws

In the final act the signatories declare that their Governments intend to apply strictly their internal laws and regulations to prevent fraudulent commerce in arms and to exchange all information on the subject; they declare further that the convention must be considered as an important step toward a general system of international agreements regarding arms and ammunition and implements of war, and that the international aspect of the manufacture of arms should receive early consideration by the different Governments.

By the declaration regarding the territory of Ifni, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925, which enters into force with the convention, the Spanish Government agrees to the inclusion in the special zones of the territory of Ifni (North Africa) and to the application to this territory of the system set forth in Chap. III of the convention, unless and until it notifies the contracting parties of a decision to the country.

Chemical Warfare

The protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925, has been in force for certain states since April 2, 1927. The protocol enters into force for each state on the date of the deposit of its ratification.

In the protocol contracting states recognize that the use of asphyxiating in war, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world, and that prohibition of such use has been made in treaties to which the majority of states are parties. With a view to the acceptance of this prohibition as a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations, the contracting states, in so far as they are not

(Continued on page 240)

Latin American Limitation of Armaments

The Central American Agreement

On February 7, 1923 the Central American Countries signed an agreement for definite limitation of Armaments. The official text of the agreement follows:



HE Governments of the Republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have signed on this date a General Treaty of Peace and Amity, and it being their desire and interest that in the future their military policy should be guided only by the exigencies of internal order, have agreed to conclude the present Convention . . .

ARTICLE I.

The Contracting Parties having taken into consideration their relative population, area, extent of frontiers and various other factors of military importance, agree that for a period of five years from the date of the coming into force of the present Convention, they shall not maintain a standing army and National Guard in excess of the number of men hereinafter provided, except in case of civil war, or impending invasion by another State.

| | |
|-------------------|-------|
| Guatemala | 5,200 |
| El Salvador | 4,200 |
| Honduras | 2,500 |
| Nicaragua | 2,500 |
| Costa Rica | 2,000 |

General officers and officers of a lower rank of the standing army, who are necessary in accordance with the military regulations of each country, are not included in the provisions of this Article, nor are those of the National Guard. The police force is also not included.

ARTICLE II.

As the first duty of armed forces of the Central American Governments is to preserve public order, each of the Contracting Parties obligates itself to establish a National Guard to co-operate with the existing armies in the preservation of order in various districts of the country and on the frontiers, and shall immediately consider the best

means for establishing it. With this end in view the Governments of the Central American States shall give consideration to the employment of suitable instructors in order to take advantage, in this manner, of experience acquired in other countries in organizing such corps.

ARTICLE III.

In no case shall the total combined force of the army and of the National Guard exceed the maximum limit fixed in the preceding Article, except in the cases therein provided.

ARTICLE IV.

None of the Contracting Parties shall have the right to possess more than ten war aircraft. Neither may any of them acquire war vessels; but armed coast guard boats shall not be considered as war vessels.

The following cases shall be considered as exceptions to this Article: civil war or threatened attack by a foreign state; in such cases the right of defense shall have no other limitations than those established by existing Treaties.

ARTICLE VII.

The present Convention shall take effect with respect to the Parties that have ratified it, from the date of its ratification by at least four of the Signatory States.

ARTICLE VIII.

The present Convention shall remain in force until the first of January, one thousand, nine hundred and twenty-nine, notwithstanding any prior denunciation, or any other cause. After the first of January, one thousand, nine hundred and twenty-nine, it shall continue in force until one year after the date on which one of the Parties bound thereby notifies the others of its intention to denounce it.

The Fifth International Conference of American States

Limitation of Armaments was discussed at the Fifth International Conference of American States held at Santiago, Chile, March 25 to May 3, 1923, but no agreement was reached. The report of the committee on armaments, whose chairman was the Hon. Henry P. Fletcher, of the United States, follows:



EFINITE and concrete proposals for limitation of armaments were presented to, and considered by, your Committee; but unfortunately it has not been possible to reach a common accord on this subject at this Conference. While earnest and sincere hopes in this respect have been disappointed, there is nevertheless no cause for discouragement. The atmosphere of peace and friendly cooperation which has marked all the deliberations of this conference has not been in any manner disturbed in the consideration of this important topic.

The points of view of the Governments most directly interested have been presented clearly; as one friend to

another. Such divergencies of opinion as appeared in the Committee related rather to the best manner of approach of a question, the satisfactory solution of which is universally admitted to be as difficult as it is desirable; but your Committee is happy to report that the discussions did not reveal the slightest or faintest suspicion on the part of any nation, nor were the peaceful motives and desires of any sister state for a moment called in question.

The Committee does not anticipate that failure on its part to arrive at more specific conclusions will close the door to further consideration by all the Governments interested, of the best ways and means to relieve their peoples, of the burden of unnecessary armaments.

The Canadian-American Boundary Agreement

A Century of Disarmament

by Moses B. Cotsworth
Peace Committee, Society of Friends



URING the year 1816 intensive warfare between British and American Naval and Military forces along the International Boundary, resulted in such great loss of lives, ships and other properties, that the commanders on both sides urged their respective governments to build more ships and forts, and send more soldiers and sailors to reinforce the 37,000 men fighting around the Great Lakes.

When that appeal from the Americans reached the American Government, the Secretary of State was away, but happily his Deputy, Richard Rush, realised how seriously each successive addition of ships, armaments and forts was adding to the bitterness of the struggle on both sides. His Quaker ancestry and training led him to consider how peace could best be restored to the mutual welfare of both the American and British people.

Inspired by that noble purpose, he became convinced that the right course to suggest to both governments was, withdraw all soldiers, sailors and ships, demolish the forts and simply decide that a Police Boat for each Nation should be stationed on each of the four Great Lakes, and that Police and Customs Officials should replace soldiers and marines along the International Boundary, to prevent smuggling, migration, and other abuses across that frontier.

Acting upon that inspiration, Richard Rush promptly wrote that simple solution on a sheet of paper and pre-

sented a copy to each Government. He personally pleaded with them to accept that way to ensure Peace, and give effect to it in the form of the Treaty he so simply drafted, that both Governments gladly signed the Treaty as printed below.

When we bear in mind the fact that it has resulted in Perpetual Peace during the last 112 years between two of the most virile and competing nations, and that along the whole course of their nearly 5,000 miles of boundary, neither the United States nor Canada have ever stationed a single soldier; where in the whole course of History can we find a greater triumph for the principles of Peace?

It was to emphasise that peaceful victory won by the application of peace principles at the right time, that the writer caused the copy of this Treaty and record of its origin to be inscribed on vellum and placed in the "Peace Arch," which the people of the United States and Canada jointly erected in 1917 at the Pacific end of that International Boundary, to celebrate the first 100 years of this lasting peace, which with its origin should be more widely known.

As an emblem of the goodwill between American and British people, a block of oak from the frame of the ship "Mayflower," which carried the Pilgrim Fathers to America, was taken from the Barn of Jordans and placed in the "Peace Arch" on the Pacific Coast.—*Extracts, see 2, pg. 256.*

The Bagot-Rush Correspondence

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1817.

The Undersigned, His Britannick Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, has the honour to acquaint Mr. Rush, that having laid before His Majesty's Government the correspondence which passed last year between the Secretary of the Department of State and the Undersigned upon the subject of a proposal to reduce the Naval Force of the respective Countries upon the American Lakes, he has received the commands of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent to acquaint the Government of the United States, that His Royal Highness is willing to accede to the proposition made to the Undersigned by the Secretary of the Department of State in his note of the 2nd of August last.

His Royal Highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, agrees, that the Naval Force to be maintained upon the American Lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following Vessels on each side—that is

On Lake Ontario to one Vessel not exceeding one hundred Tons burthen and armed with one eighteen pound cannon.

On the Upper Lakes to two Vessels not exceeding like burthen each and armed with like force.

On the waters of Lake Champlain to one Vessel not exceeding like burthen and armed with like force.

And His Royal Highness agrees, that all other armed

Vessels on these Lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and that no other Vessels of War shall be there built or armed.

His Royal Highness further agrees, that if either Party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this Stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other Party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

The Undersigned has it in command from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to acquaint the American Government, that His Royal Highness has issued orders to His Majesty's Officers on the Lakes directing, that the Naval Force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other Party.

The Undersigned has the honour to renew to Mr. Rush the assurance of his highest consideration.

CHARLES BAGOT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
April 29, 1817.



HE Undersigned, acting Secretary of State, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Bagot's note of the 28th of this month, informing him that, having laid before the Government of His Britannick Majesty, the correspondence which passed last year between the Secretary of

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What the United States Has Done Toward Limiting Armaments

*The Washington Conference of 1921—The Geneva Conference of 1927—
President Hoover's Efforts*



OR three hundred years before the World War, the British Empire was in command of the seas, a command which in the eyes of England was necessary to protect the widespread dominions of the Empire and to insure the food supply and the trade of the people of the British Isles. The German Navy Law of 1898 challenged this supremacy. It was met by the reply that Great Britain would maintain a two-power standard—a navy equal in strength to that of any other two European powers. In the opinion of many writers, the naval rivalry between Great Britain and Germany, which was a reflex of political and commercial rivalry, had much to do with bringing about the World War.

Post-War Navy Building

During and immediately following the war, British supremacy of the seas was challenged by the United States. Aroused by the fears of the German naval power and the needs of protecting troop transports and commerce, the American Congress passed a Naval Appropriation Act in 1916 which authorized the construction within three years of ten first-class battleships, six battle cruisers, and a large number of smaller vessels. The execution of this program was delayed by America's entrance into the war and the diversion of building facilities to submarines and merchantmen. At the close of the war, however, construction was resumed. The avowed purpose of American policy, as defined by the General Board of the Navy, was the creation of a "navy equal to the most powerful maintained" by any other nation in the world. Had the American program been completed, the American navy would have been actually stronger than the British navy in 1924.

Winston Churchill on Britain's Navy

In the years immediately following the Armistice and the elimination of the German fleet, the British Government curtailed construction and even went so far as to do away with the Home Fleet. But, in 1921, it again began construction of capital ships, and Mr. Winston Churchill, soon after the Armistice, declared "Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however specious, no appeals, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends."

The Dismantling of the German Fleet

The first step in naval disarmament came at the close of the World War which brought to a humiliating end the powerful German fleet. The Armistice Agreement obliged Germany to surrender all of its submarines to the Allies and to dismantle or intern all surface warships.

The Treaty of Versailles limited the German navy to 6 small battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12

torpedo boats. Upon replacement, armored ships are limited to 10,000 tons, light cruisers to 6,000 tons, destroyers to 800 tons and torpedo boats to 200 tons.

The Treaty absolutely prohibits the construction or use of submarines, even for commercial purposes, by Germany.

England and the United States Continue Building

These crushing provisions had no effect upon the capital ship program of the United States, nor did they prevent the British Government from reviving capital ship construction in 1921. Moreover, the building program of the United States, together with its Far Eastern policy, was apparently instrumental in causing the adoption by Japan of the so-called "eight-eight" program in 1920 under which Japan planned to build a navy of 16 capital ships (nearly as large a navy as the United States has today) by 1928.

In the midst of an apparently impending naval competition between governments which were Associates and Allies during the World War, the American Government invited Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to participate with it in a Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments—A Conference which also dealt with certain Pacific and Far Eastern questions. The Conference met in Washington from November, 1921, to February, 1922. Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, the American Secretary of State, proposed that the United States give up its "1916" program and that Japan give up its "eight-eight" program so that the American and British fleets would approach equality while the Japanese fleet would be about sixty per cent as strong—the 5-5-3 ratio.

Agreement on Battleships Reached

After a month's negotiation, an agreement was reached in regard to battleships, according to which the three leading naval powers agreed to scrap a total of 70 ships, built or building, having a total tonnage of about 1,644,839 tons. The United States made the greatest sacrifice, scrapping a total of 32 ships. All of the governments had carried out their scrapping obligations by February 17, 1925.

In addition to scrapping these vessels, the governments agreed not to lay down any new building programs except for replacement which may begin only in 1931. Ordinarily, a battleship may not be replaced until 20 years after its construction.

Replacements Provided For

Replacement was to be made so that eventually the United States and Great Britain would have a total of 15 battleships each, with a tonnage of 525,000; Japan, 9 battleships with a tonnage of 315,000; France and Italy, 5 battleships each, with a tonnage of 175,000.

The Washington Treaty also limited the total tonnage of aircraft carriers to 135,000 tons in the case of the United States and the British Empire; 60,000 tons in the case of France and Italy; and 81,000 tons in the case of Japan.

Treaty Failed to Limit Auxiliaries

While the Washington Conference was successful in limiting capital ships, it failed to put an end to competition in the building of submarines, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft. France blocked the limitation of submarine building, contending that a submarine tonnage of at least 90,000 tons was essential to the defense of the French colonies and as a substitute for the inferior position France was obliged to occupy in regard to capital ships, owing to its inability to construct such ships during the World War. Great Britain declined to make any agreement authorizing this figure, in belief that such a great number of submarines would be a menace to England. When no agreement proved possible in regard to submarines, England declined to limit cruisers on the ground that they were a necessary defense against submarine attack.

Sizes of War Craft Fixed

The Washington Naval Treaty defined the maximum size at which battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers could be fixed. The limit for battleships was fixed at 35,000 tons; cruisers, at 10,000 tons and aircraft carriers at 27,000 tons. Sixteen-inch guns were authorized for capital ships and eight-inch guns for cruisers and aircraft carriers. These maximum sizes have been criticized as unduly liberal. With one exception the largest battleship in existence at the time of the Washington Conference was 33,800 tons, and the majority were under 30,000 tons; the largest aircraft carrier was 22,600 tons; and the average cruiser was 6,000 tons—the limit fixed for German cruisers in the Treaty of Versailles. These maximum limits tended to become the standard upon which naval construction in the future should be based. One reason for fixing these limits was the fact that cruisers laid down in 1916 and 1917, by Great Britain, were designed to have a tonnage of 9,750 tons. As a result of the Washington Treaty, the cost of construction as well as the power of these vessels increased.

Washington Treaty Still in Force

The Washington Naval Treaty remains in force until December 31, 1936, and thereafter it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years after notice by any party of its intention to terminate.

If, during the term of the treaty, the "requirements of the national security" of any contracting power "in respect of naval defense," are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at its request, meet in conference with a view to the revision of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

"In view of possible technical and scientific developments," the United States shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting Powers, which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the treaty—or August, 1931.

The Geneva Conference of 1927

As an outgrowth of the disarmament work of the League of Nations, the League Council established a Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference, composed of military and naval experts, which held three sessions between May, 1926, and April, 1927. The United States accepted an invitation to participate in the work of the Commission, the purpose of which was not to reach an agreement as to the actual limitation of armaments, but simply to define the terms and the methods by which a later conference might bring about limitation. In the course of the discussions, a division arose between one group of nations, led by France, and another group composed primarily of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, the first group taking the position that land, sea and air armaments are interdependent and that it would be impossible to agree upon the limitation of one type of armament without simultaneously limiting other types. Owing to the great practical difficulties of reaching a universal agreement in regard to all types of armaments, the United States feared that a deadlock had developed at Geneva, and that little progress through this channel could be made. Consequently, President Coolidge hoped that an agreement could be reached between some of the states on the point that navies could be limited apart from armies and aircraft.

President Coolidge Calls a Naval Conference

On February 10, President Coolidge invited Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to negotiate, through their delegates to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, an agreement for the limitation of those classes of naval vessels which had not been covered by the Washington Treaty. The American Government believed that at such a conference it would be possible to bring about an agreement in regard to navies while leaving to the future the limitation of other forms of armaments.

"Competitive Armaments Lead to War"

In a message to Congress of the same date, President Coolidge declared that competitive armaments "constitute one of the most dangerous contributing causes of international suspicion and discord and are calculated eventually to lead to war."

Both the French and Italian Governments declined to participate in the Coolidge Conference. The French Government stated that such a conference would risk compromising the success of the disarmament work undertaken by the League of Nations. It believed that naval armaments could not be limited without taking into consideration land and air armaments. The Italian Government declined on the ground that because "of its unfavorable geographical position" it could not expose itself "without grave risks to a binding limitation of its armaments." Nevertheless, both the Italian and French Governments sent observers to the Conference.

The United States, Great Britain and Japan

The British and the Japanese Governments accepted the American invitation, following which the date of the conference, thus limited to three governments, was finally fixed at June 20, 1927. Its meeting place was Geneva.

The Conference lasted from June 20 to August 4, 1927. It consisted of three plenary sessions, which were open to the public, and which were largely formal in nature. The bulk of the work, however, was done in committees and in informal meetings which were held in secret. A number of writers have stated that as a result of the secrecy with which the Geneva Conference was held, rumors and distorted statements appeared in the press which prejudiced a real settlement and kept the public in ignorance of the fundamental issues involved.

The Points at Issue

At the first plenary session the Hon. Hugh Gibson, head of the American Delegation, was elected chairman of the Conference. In his address he stated that there was "assured agreement on the following points":

1. That in the interest of international understanding there should be no competition between the Three Powers in the building of naval armaments.
2. That our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security and should never be of a size or character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent.
3. That a wise economy in Government dictates that future naval construction should be kept to a minimum.
4. That the methods and principles of limitation set forth in the Washington Treaty are both practical and effective and should be extended to all categories of combatant vessels of the Three Powers.

What Was Brought Out at Conference

Subsequent discussion showed, however, that there was not complete agreement upon the application of these points at least as far as the British and American delegations were concerned.

During the course of the Conference three important issues confronted the delegates:

1. The ratio of naval strength, that is, whether or not the United States and Great Britain should be on a parity with respect to auxiliary vessels, in a ratio of 5 to 3 with Japan.
2. Limitation within the total tonnage of different classes of ships, that is, whether any restriction should be placed on the number of 10,000 ton, eight-inch cruisers.
3. The amount of tonnage and the number of ships.

Factors Contributing to Failure at Geneva

The failure of the Conference appears to have been due to America's insistence upon retaining complete freedom to mount large or small cruisers with eight-inch guns and to Great Britain's insistence upon an absolute minimum of seventy cruisers. At the conclusion of the Conference each delegation attempted to place the entire responsibility for the breakdown on the other.

Aside from these major technical differences, other reasons for the failure have been advanced by American and British observers. One factor which has been widely commented upon was the fundamentally different concept of naval requirements. Throughout the Conference the British delegation argued that Britain's naval needs are "absolute" while the American delegation declared that all naval requirements are "relative," a fact which was recognized, according to Mr. Gibson, in the Washington

Naval Treaty. The American delegation further maintained that if naval needs were not relative, international agreement was impossible. At the third plenary session, Mr. Gibson had said that, "if we assume that naval needs are absolute, each country must be the sole judge of its naval needs, which cannot then be subjected to reduction by agreement with other powers."

The Charge of Inadequate Preparation

Several Americans, notably Vice-President Dawes, and a number of Englishmen, including Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald (not then in office), have suggested that inadequate preparations for the Conference were responsible in part for the final failure. Speaking at Niagara Falls on August 7, Vice-President Dawes said, "Perhaps, before this Conference was held, there was not the preliminary careful appraisal by each conferee of the necessities of the other; perhaps too exclusive concentration by each conferee upon the necessities of his own nation resulted in a pre-determined ultimatum before a comparison of views; perhaps the public announcement of respective programs early in the Conference produced fears of domestic public repercussion if they were reasonably modified as would be necessary to effect an agreement."

Public Opinion in Great Britain

Public opinion, as expressed in the press of Great Britain and the United States, did not appear to accept with any unanimity the explanations for the failure advanced by the two delegations. While the Conservative press in Great Britain was inclined to blame the United States for the failure, a very large section of the Liberal press expressed open disfavor at the break-down.

American Public Opinion

Editorial opinion in the American press was considerably divided as to the results of the Conference. A survey made during August, 1927, of the editorials in 119 leading newspapers supporting the Administration, comprising roughly 50 per cent of the total survey, were in general against an increase in the American Navy as a result of the Geneva failure. The prevailing view in these papers was that a naval armament race would not and should not result from failure. While a number of these papers were inclined to lay the blame for the collapse of negotiations at Great Britain's door, they expressed little bitterness toward Great Britain and advanced many other reasons for the failure.

Of newspapers critical of the Administration, a majority warned that the failure of the Conference would be used as a weapon by the "Big Navy" group in Congress. These papers also charged that the preparation for the Conference was inadequate, that it was impossible to accomplish anything in the absence of France and Italy, and argued that direct negotiation between governments is preferable to such conferences.

Newspapers advocating a substantial increase in the Navy comprised roughly 30 per cent of the total included in the survey. A majority of these papers felt that the failure of the Conference would bring home to the American people the realization that our navy should at least equal that of Britain.—*Extracts, see 3, pg. 256.*

The Hoover Administration Appeals for Further Limitation of Naval Armament

Recent Efforts Made by President Hoover and Other U. S. Government Officials to Bring About Another Conference Among World's Leading Naval Powers

Plea for Arms Limitation in Mr. Hoover's Speech of Acceptance



THINK I may say that I have witnessed as much of the horror and suffering of war as any other American. From it I have derived a deep passion for peace. Our foreign policy has one primary object, and that is peace. We have no hates; we wish no further possessions; we harbor no military threats.

There are two co-operating factors in the maintenance of peace—the building of good will by wise and sympathetic handling of international relations, and the adequate preparedness for defense. We must not only be just; we must be respected. Our offer of treaties open

to the signature of all, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, proves that we have every desire to co-operate with other nations for peace. Our country has refused membership in the League of Nations, but we are glad to co-operate with the League in its endeavors to further scientific, economic, and social welfare and to secure limitation of armament.

We are particularly desirous of furthering the limitation of armaments. But we must and shall maintain our naval defense and our merchant marine in the strength and efficiency which will yield to us at all times the primary assurance of liberty, that is, of national safety.

Ambassador Hugh S. Gibson's Plea at Geneva

Speech of U. S. Ambassador to Belgium Before League of Nations Commission April 22, 1929



HE disarmament problem may be divided into two parts, land and naval armaments. As regards land armaments, the American Delegation will be able when we reach this question in our discussion to defer to the countries primarily interested in land armaments with such measure of concession as I trust will materially facilitate agreement among them.

My country's defence is primarily a naval problem. The American Government has found no reason for modifying its view that the simplest, fairest and most practical method is that of limitation by tonnage by categories—a method which has been given practical and satisfactory application in the Washington Treaty. While it is realized that this does not constitute an exact and scientific gauge of strategic strength, we have nevertheless found that it constitutes a method which has the advantage of simplicity and of affording to each Power the freedom to utilize its tonnage within the limitation of each category according to its special needs.

The French Plan

The American Delegation has urged this view throughout the first reading, but, in view of the inacceptability to some other delegations of our unmodified thesis, my Government has sought in the various methods presented some solution which might offer the possibility of com-

promise and general acceptance. During the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission, the French Delegation brought forward a method which was an attempt to combine its original total tonnage proposals with the method of tonnage by categories. Under this method, a total tonnage was assigned to each nation and this total divided among categories of ships by specified tonnages. If I am not mistaken certain modifications were suggested in informal discussions, so as to provide that the tonnage allocated to any given category might be increased by a certain percentage to be agreed upon, such increase to be transferred from any other category or categories not already fixed by existing treaty.

Full Discussion Favored

In the hope of facilitating general agreement as to naval armaments, my Government is disposed to accept the French proposal as a basis of discussion. It is, of course, the understanding of my Government that this involves an agreement upon the method alone and not upon any quantitative tonnages or the actual percentages to be transferred from one category to another. All quantitative proposals of any kind should properly be reserved from discussion by a final conference.

My Government is disposed to give full and friendly consideration to any supplementary methods of limitation which may be calculated to make our proposals, the

French thesis, or any other acceptable to other Powers and if such a course appears desirable, my Government will be prepared to give consideration to a method of estimating equivalent naval values which takes account of other factors than displacement tonnage alone. In order to arrive at a basis of comparison in the case of categories in which there are marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might be desirable in arriving at a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as age, unit displacement, and caliber of guns. My Government has given careful consideration to various methods of comparison and the American Delegation will be in a position to discuss the subject whenever it comes before the Commission.

Substantial Results Desired

In alluding briefly to these possible methods, I desire to lay special emphasis on the fact that for us the essential thing is the achievement of substantial results. Methods are of secondary importance.

I feel that we are able to deal to best advantage with the specific questions on our agenda only if we bear clearly in mind the recent important changes in world conditions.

The Outlawry of War Treaty

Since our last meeting, the nations of the world have bound themselves by solemn undertaking to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. We believe (and we hope that our belief is shared by the other nations) that this agreement affirming humanity's will to peace will advance the cause of disarmament by removing doubts and fears which in the past have constituted our principal obstacle. It has recently been my privilege to discuss the general problem of disarmament at considerable length with President Hoover, who has always been an ardent advocate of peace and good understanding. I am in a position to realize, perhaps as well as anyone, how earnestly he feels that the Pact for the Renunciation of War opens to use an unprecedented opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament, an opportunity which admits of no postponement.

"A War-Taxed Peace"

Any approach to the disarmament problem on purely technical grounds is bound to be inconclusive. The technical justification of armaments is based upon the experience of past wars and upon the anticipation of future wars. So long as the approach to the problem is based upon old fears and old suspicions, there is little hope of disarmament. The lessons of the old strategies must be unlearned. If we are honest, if our solemn promise in the Pact means anything, there is no justification for the continuation of a war-taxed peace. Great armaments are but the relic of another age, but they will remain a necessary relic until the present deadlock is broken and that can be accomplished only by the decision of the Powers possessing the greatest armaments to initiate measures of reduction.

In the opening statement at the Three Power Naval Conference in 1927 I took occasion, in suggesting certain tonnage levels as a basis of discussion, to say that the

United States is prepared to agree to a plan for limitation at still lower levels which maintain the relative status of existing treaties with respect to the Powers represented at that Conference. This is still the attitude of my Government and I am authorized to state that on this basis we are willing to agree to any reduction however drastic of naval tonnage which leaves no type of war vessel unrestricted.

"Limitation" vs. Actual Reduction

A large part of the suggestions for limitation hitherto made seem to have been of such a nature as to sanction existing armaments or even to set higher levels with tacit encouragement to increase existing establishments. This is only a timid expedient and an agreement on the basis of existing world armaments (or at higher levels) can never be justified before enlightened public opinion as a positive achievement. At best it is purely negative. Fundamentally, our purpose should be to release large numbers of men from military service to productive effort, and second, to reduce the heavy burden of taxation. So long as the nations are burdened with increasing taxation for the maintenance of armaments it is idle to pretend that the world is really advancing toward the goal of disarmament. In recent years the word "limitation" has come to be used chiefly in describing agreements at existing levels or still higher levels, and is generally looked upon as having nothing to do with actual reduction. It is useless to attempt to correct this impression by explaining that limitation may be at any level lower or higher than those existing. As a practical matter, it would seem to be best to accept the general public understanding of these terms. Let us therefore take the bold course and begin by scrapping the term "limitation" in order to concentrate upon a general reduction of armaments.

All Classes of Vessels to Be Limited

My Government believes that there can be no complete and effective limitation of armament unless all classes of war vessels, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, are limited. It could not agree to any method which would result in leaving any class of combatant vessels unrestricted. In its reply, under date of September 28, 1928, to communications from the British and French Governments concerning an understanding reached between them as to a basis of naval limitation, my Government pointed out that this understanding applied to only one type of cruiser and one type of submarine and would leave totally unlimited a large class of effective fighting units. This note also called attention to the American position at the Geneva Naval Conference and the fact that a proposal for general reduction was urged by the American Delegation.

American Eagerness for Reduction

The willingness of my Government, I may even say its eagerness, to go to low levels, is based upon the fundamental belief that naval needs are relative, namely, that what we may require for our defense depends chiefly upon the size of the navies maintained by others. Aside from the signatories of the Washington Treaty, there is no conceivable combination of naval power which could threaten the safety of any of the principal naval Powers. What justification can there be for the Powers which lead in the respective classes of naval vessels to sanction

further building programs in those classes. In the case of the United States we have already expressed our willingness to agree on a basis that would mean a substantial reduction of our present destroyer and submarine types. In the case of cruisers it is only possession by others of greatly superior strength in this class which has led to the adoption of the present building program.

No Justification for Large Navies

My Government cannot find any justification for the building and maintenance of large naval establishments save on the ground that no Power can reduce except as a result of general reduction. Let us ask ourselves honestly what these establishments are for. As regards the relations of the maritime Powers among themselves, there is no such need.

Even if the danger of war is admitted, it could be guarded against just as well by the maintenance of relative strength at low levels as at higher levels. The principal naval Powers have nothing to fear from the naval strength of the countries nonsignatory to the Washington Treaty. There is no conceivable combination of naval strength among the nonsignatory Powers which need give concern. As an example, the cruiser strength of all the nonsignatory countries in the world does not attain to one-half of the cruiser tonnage of the greatest single fleet.

The people of every country are crying out against the burdens of taxation and demanding the suppression of unnecessary expenditure. My Government is convinced that expenditure for disproportionate naval establishments is indefensible in that it can be avoided by a sensible agreement among the naval Powers. And we must recognize that the people who pay taxes are bound to feel-

well-founded resentment against any policy which commits them to needless taxation through failure to reach rational agreements.

Naval Needs Relative

My Government believes firmly in its idea that naval needs are relative and that radical general reduction is possible only on the theory of relative needs. I trust that these views may commend themselves to other Governments and that it may be possible to agree upon such reductions. If, however, it is impossible to agree on this thesis, it is obvious that there will remain only the thesis of absolute naval needs. This would mean that all thought of reduction is abandoned, that each country retains a free hand in building with an inevitable tendency toward competition. Surely we can hardly envisage such a sequel to our solemn undertaking to keep the peace.

My Government has always felt that we need no exact balance of ships and guns which can be based only upon the idea of conflict—what is really wanted is a common-sense agreement, based on the idea that we are going to be friends and settle our problems by peaceful means. My Government has never believed that an effective approach to the problem of disarmament could be made by methods of reduction of armaments alone. It feels that genuine disarmament will follow only from a change of attitude toward the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. It is for that reason that I venture to make this appeal that the countries here represented examine the whole problem afresh in the hope that they will find in general world conditions and in the solemn obligation they have taken among themselves a reassurance as to their security and that they will find in this the confidence to enable them to dispense with the armaments which hitherto have seemed so essential.

President Hoover's Memorial Day Address

Delivered at Arlington Cemetery, May 30, 1929



ODAY, as never before in peace, new life-destroying instrumentalities and new systems of warfare are being added to those that even so recently spread death and desolation over the whole continent of Europe. Despite those lessons every government continues to increase and perfect its armament. And while this progress is being made in the development of the science of warfare, the serious question arises—are we making equal progress in devising ways and means to avoid those frightful fruits of men's failures that have blotted with blood so many chapters of the world's history?

The Outlawry of War Treaties

There is a great hope, for since this day a year ago, a solemn declaration has been proposed by America to the world and has been signed by forty nations. It states that they

"Solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

They

"Agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may rise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

War Preparedness Continues

That is a declaration that springs from the aspirations and hearts of men and women throughout the world. It is a solemn covenant to which the great nations of the world have bound themselves.

But notwithstanding this noble assurance, preparedness for war still advances steadily in every land. As a result the pessimist calls this covenant a pious expression of foreign offices, a trick of statesmen on the hopes of humanity, for which we and other nations will be held responsible without reserve. With this view I cannot agree.

But, if this agreement is to fulfill its high purpose, we and other nations must accept its consequences; we must clothe faith and idealism with action. That action must march with the inexorable tread of common sense and realism to accomplishment.

Armaments for Defense

If this declaration really represents the aspirations of peoples; if this covenant be genuine proof that the world has renounced war as an instrument of national policy, it means at once an abandonment of the aggressive use of arms by every signatory nation and becomes a sincere declaration that all armament hereafter shall be used only for defense. Consequently, if we are honest we must reconsider our own naval armament and the armaments of the world in the light of their defensive and not their aggressive use. Our Navy is the first, and in the world sense the only important, factor in our national preparedness. It is a powerful part of the arms of the world.

Strength of Fleets Relative

To make ready for defense is a primary obligation upon every statesman and adequate preparedness is an assurance against aggression. But, if we are to earnestly predicate our views upon renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, if we are to set standards that naval strength is purely for defense and not for aggression, then the strength in fighting ships required by nations is but relative to that of other powers. All nations assent to this—that defensive needs of navies are relative. Moreover, other nations concede our contention for parity. With these principles before us our problem is to secure agreement among nations that we shall march together toward reductions in naval equipment.

Actual Reduction Needed

Despite the declarations of the Kellogg pact, every important country has since the signing of that agreement been engaged in strengthening its naval arm. We are still borne on the tide of competitive building. Fear and suspicion disappear but slowly from the world. Democracies can only be led to undertake the burdens of increasing naval construction by continued appeal to fear, by constant envisaging of possible conflict, by stimulated imaginings of national dangers, by glorification of war. Fear and suspicion will never slacken unless we can halt competitive construction of arms. They will never disappear unless we can turn this tide toward actual reduction.

But to arrive at any agreement through which we can, marching in company with our brother nations, secure reduction of armament, we must find a rational yardstick with which to make reasonable comparisons of their naval units with ours and thus maintain an agreed rela-

tivity. So far the world has failed to find such a yardstick. To say that such a measure cannot be found is the counsel of despair, it is a challenge to the naval authorities of the world, it is the condemnation of the world to the Sisyphean toil of competitive armaments.

America's New Program

The present Administration of the United States has undertaken to approach this vital problem with a new program. We feel that it is useless for us to talk of the limitation of arms if such limitations are to be set so high as virtually to be an incitement to increase armament. The idea of limitation of arms has served a useful purpose. It made possible conferences in which the facts about national aspirations could be discussed frankly in an atmosphere of friendliness and conciliation. Likewise the facts of the technical problems involved, and the relative values of varying national needs, have been clarified by patient comparison of expert opinions.

But still the net result has been the building of more fighting ships. Therefore we believe the time has come when we must know whether the pact we have signed is real, whether we are condemned to further and more extensive programs of naval construction. Limitation upward is not now our goal, but actual reduction of existing commitments to lowered levels.

Blessings to Be Achieved

Such a program, if it be achieved, is fraught with endless blessings. The smaller the armed force of the world, the less will armed force be left in the minds of men as an instrument of national policy. The smaller the armed forces of the world, the less will be the number of men withdrawn from the creative and productive labors. Thus we shall relieve the toilers of the nations of the deadening burden of unproductive expenditures, and above all, we shall deliver them from the greatest of human calamities—fear. We shall breathe an air cleared of poison, of destructive thought, and of potential war.

But the pact that we have signed by which we renounce war as an instrument of national policy, by which we agree to settle all conflicts, of whatever nature, by pacific means, implies more than the reduction of arms to a basis of simple defense. It implies that nations will conduct their daily intercourse in keeping with the spirit of that agreement. It implies that we shall endeavor to develop those instrumentalities of peaceful adjustment that will enable us to remove disputes from the field of emotion to the field of calm and judicial consideration.

Ambassador Dawes' London Speech

U. S. Ambassador Urges Disarmament at Pilgrims' Dinner, London, June 18, 1929



HE ratification of the Kellogg peace treaty, which is the agreed upon expression of a world intention, has one of its first effects in a pronounced change in the form of international discussion of the world's peace. The closing of the discussion upon the form of the expression of the principle and the inception of the discussion of the practical methods by which to make it effective prove the existence of the general determination to make the treaty not mere gesture, but the foundation of an era of "peace on earth and good will toward men."

The matter of first importance at the present time is that the friends of the world's peace move unitedly toward that objective with a clear understanding among themselves that any effort which is not an united effort is

liable to be ineffective and tending toward disintegration.

To avoid confusion and delay endangering their common objective, they now should not only unitedly consider what steps should be taken toward it, but the order in which those steps are to be taken.

The importance of an early agreement on naval reduction by nations is of outstanding importance at the present time, and it would seem to be the next step to be taken toward world peace.

As to any other controverted questions between any nations, or between Great Britain and the United States, their future peaceful settlement, either way, will not be endangered by the cessation of an enormously expensive naval competition in progress during their discussion.

Comparison of Leading Navies



N September 15, 1929, the office of Naval Intelligence of the U. S. Navy Department, made public a table giving the comparative strength of the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan.

With the exception of capital ships which were completed prior to the Washington treaty, all ships are given in standard or treaty tons. The tonnage of capital ships is given in accordance with the national systems of measurement, or "normal" tonnage, except for the British battleships Rodney and Nelson, which were completed subsequent to the Washington Treaty.

Included in the table, in addition to capital ships, are aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines within the effective age limits, as specified in the Washington treaty, of twenty years for capital ships, aircraft carriers and cruisers; sixteen years for destroyers, and thirteen years for submarines.

Standard tonnage is the displacement of a vessel ready for sea but without fuel or feed water on board, whereas normal tonnage is the displacement with the fuel and feed water included.

The table follows:

| UNITED STATES | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----|---------|--------------------|------------|-------|---------|-----------|
| | No. | Built | Under Construction | Authorized | Total | | |
| | | Tons | No. | No. | No. | Tons | Tons |
| Capital ships | 18 | 525,850 | .. | (a) | 18 | 525,850 | |
| Aircraft carriers | 3 | 76,286 | .. | 1 | 4 | 90,086 | |
| Cruisers | 10 | 70,500 | 13 | 10 | 33 | 300,500 | |
| Destroyer types | 284 | 290,304 | .. | (b) | 284 | 290,304 | |
| Submarines | 108 | 77,062 | 2 | 3 | 113 | 87,232 | |
| Total | | | | | | | 1,293,972 |
| BRITISH EMPIRE | | | | | | | |
| | No. | Tons | No. | No. | No. | Tons | Tons |
| Capital ships | 20 | 556,350 | .. | (a) | 20 | 556,350 | |
| Aircraft carriers | 5 | 92,850 | 1 | .. | 6 | 115,350 | |
| Cruisers | 52 | 311,991 | 7 | (c) 66,800 | 62 | 401,791 | |
| Destroyer types | 153 | 159,280 | 20 | 9 | 182 | 198,400 | |
| Submarines | 50 | 42,061 | 14 | 6 | 70 | 73,341 | |
| Total | | | | | | | 1,345,232 |
| JAPAN | | | | | | | |
| | No. | Tons | No. | No. | No. | Tons | Tons |
| Capital ships | 10 | 301,320 | .. | (a) | 10 | 301,320 | |
| Aircraft carriers | 3 | 61,270 | .. | .. | 3 | 61,270 | |
| Cruisers | 22 | 156,415 | 5 | .. | 33 | 206,415 | |
| Destroyer types | 99 | 102,190 | 8 | 8 | 115 | 129,390 | |
| Submarines | 61 | 61,357 | 6 | 4 | 71 | 78,497 | |
| Total | | | | | | | 776,892 |

Notes

(a) United States and British Empire under Washington Treaty are scheduled to lay down and complete five capital ships of a maximum of 175,000 tons prior to Dec. 31, 1936; Japan three capital ships of a maximum of 105,000 tons prior to that date.

(b) In addition the United States has twelve destroyers authorized by act of Congress Aug. 29, 1916, but no funds have ever been authorized for their construction.

(c) Includes Surrey and Northumberland, the construction of which has been postponed.

(Continued from page 229)

already parties to treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend it to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The high contracting parties further undertake to do all in their power to induce other states to adhere to the protocol.

Nations Signing Protocol

The protocol has been signed by Abyssinia, Belgium, Brazil, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Salvador, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and Uruguay.

A series of questions respecting chemical warfare has been answered and sent to the Preparatory Commission.

Private Manufacture of Arms

The members of the League by Art. 8, par. 5, of the Covenant "agree that the manufacture by private enter-

prise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections." They lay upon the Council the duty "to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety."

Preliminary investigations were made by the Temporary Mixed Commission. After the Conference on Control of the Trade in Arms in 1925, the Council transmitted a series of questions on private manufacture to states and prepared a preliminary draft convention. This draft was criticised by Member states, and in March, 1927, a special Commission on the Private Manufacture of Arms and Ammunitions and of Implements of War, consisting of representatives of states Members of the Council, tried to combine all views in a single draft. It tried again in August, 1928, and in November of the same year, both the Eighth and Ninth Assemblies have spurred it on by the passage of resolutions. The chief difference of opinion is whether suppression of arms manufacture should be confined to private plants or be reinforced by publicity on state manufacture.—*Extracts, see 1, pg. 256.*

Leading up to the Hoover-MacDonald Meeting

Steps Taken From April to October, 1929

April 22—Hon. Hugh S. Gibson, U. S. Ambassador to Belgium stated America's position before the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, at Geneva.

May 20—President Hoover made appeal for further arms limitation in his Memorial Day speech, Arlington National Cemetery.

June 18—Hon. Chas. G. Dawes, U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain, discussed arms limitation in a speech at the Pilgrims Dinner, London.

July 24—Statements by British Prime Minister and President Hoover concerning slowing down of cruiser construction.

July 28—Unofficial information from the White House, published in the press, indicated that London was agreeable to America as the site for the proposed conference.

July 29—President Hoover and Premier MacDonald exchanged messages regarding the scope of the proposed conference.

July 30—President Hoover made public a letter from him to Col. Paul V. McNutt, National Commander of the American Legion upholding the principle of parity in the prospective limitation of armament conference.

August 1—Senator William E. Borah, Idaho, Republican, in a public statement, urged Great Britain to reduce the number of her cruisers.

August 4—Senator Claude A. Swanson, Virginia, Democrat, declared President had no right to suspend the cruiser building program without the consent of Congress.

August 15—President Hoover discussed naval limitation problem with heads of the Departments of State and the Navy at a White House breakfast.

August 23—White House confirmed reports that Pre-

mier Ramsay MacDonald would visit Washington in October.

August 23—Ambassador Dawes, in a speech at the Town Hall, Elgin, Scotland, appealed to the people of Great Britain and the United States to back the Hoover-MacDonald efforts to reduce armaments.

August 26—President Hoover held a conference with Secretaries of State and the Navy on progress of the negotiations with Great Britain.

August 29—Washington press dispatches announced the statements from London were such that President Hoover felt that the cruiser building program of the United States should be carried out.

August 31—Washington press dispatches stated that Premier MacDonald would arrive in Washington on October 4, for a six-day visit.

September 4—At a breakfast at the White House, attended by officials of the Department of State and the Navy, the General Board of the Navy was instructed to work out a basis for determining how much the cruiser strength of each nation should be reduced.

September 11—Official announcement issued in London stated that Premier MacDonald would sail for America on September 28.

September 11—President Hoover held long conference with naval officials on final reply to Premier MacDonald.

September 12—Secretary of State Stimson announced that negotiations had reached a point which insured the calling of a formal conference.

September 28—Prime Minister MacDonald sailed for New York on the S. S. Berengaria.

October 4—Prime Minister MacDonald arrived in Washington.

Great Britain's Position on the Disarmament Problem

Prime Minister MacDonald's Speech Before the League of Nations at Geneva, September 3, 1929



We get together here as members of the League, in the spirit of the League and with unruffled friendship and unreserved cooperation we are facing political and economic problems that are likely to give trouble to Europe. We began, as I've said, with the pact of peace. The British Government and I'm sure everyone else—but I speak for the British Government—is desirous that the pact shall not only be a declaration on paper but shall be translated into constitutions and institutions that will work for the peace of Europe.

Would Close Old Chapter

And let us remember—those of us who carry very heavy burdens of responsibility on our shoulders, those of us who do not dare to put our signatures to agreements unless they have been examined carefully and found to be right—let us with those responsibilities on our shoulders remember that the peoples of the whole world ask us to go ahead, that the peoples of every nation ask us to be quick in our action, because the peoples of the whole world want to close forever the old military chapters of Europe and begin new ones, brighter and more hopeful in their prospects.

So with undivided minds the League must bend itself to solve this problem of disarmament. Disarmament, progress toward disarmament, agreements between nations that mean reduction of existing standards of armaments; these undoubtedly measure the progress that we've already made in peace-making like a barometer.

Reduce Risks of War

Yes, but they do more than that. Whilst measuring progress they also make further progress possible. Disarmament doesn't follow only on successful peace negotiations; disarmament makes successful peace negotiations more possible than they are under military systems. Our people will never feel comfortable, never be able to trust to common sense, ordinary sound human common sense, until you and I and all of us together by co-operative enterprise have substantially reduced the risks of war, and one of the greatest risks of war is that some of us—all of us—are still too heavily armed.

Great Britain's Position

Therefore, the British Government will do everything it possibly can to hasten preparations for a disarmament conference. I would urge the commissions—the preparatory commission and the others—not to face their problems in the mentality of the possibility of war, because they will never go very far if that is how they face their problems.

I would urge them to face them on the assumption that

the risk of war now breaking out is far less than that of peace being permanently observed.

Negotiations With United States

The British Government desires and is now working at the production of actual definite results. Our special contribution to this, and our first contribution, must be in the field of naval armaments, and it must be recognized by everyone—everyone who has entered into the difficult and very intricate problem that that represents—that the best preliminary to successful international issue on that is an agreement between the Americans and ourselves regarding our own position.

I hope when I say this that it will arouse neither jealousy nor suspicion in the hearts of other nations. May I ask them to take it from me that the conversations in which America and ourselves have been engaged are in no sense a conspiracy against anybody.

By the widest stretch of the most malign imagination those conversations cannot be represented at all except as conversations that have been taking place between two powers who, by coming to an agreement between themselves first of all, wish to throw that agreement into the world as a healing and helpful lead to the rest of the world.

Will Not Build Against U. S.

The problem of armaments is not a problem between the United States and ourselves. The British Government declines absolutely to build up against the United States, and the United States can take that as a last word, because it is not only the word of the Labor Government, it is also the word of its predecessors, the Conservative Government.

Agreement Almost Reached

But what we want is to get an agreement which, having been made can be the preliminary to the calling of a five-power naval conference, the other powers being as free to put in their proposals and we being as free to negotiate with them as though no conversations had taken place between America and ourselves; and the only value of the conversations when the five-power conference is called is that we ourselves do not require to look at each other; the agreement has made us free agents to promote the naval disarmament of the whole world.

Our conversation has not yet been ended, but agreement has gone very far. I don't quite know what form it will take and can say nothing at the moment that would in any way hamper President Hoover in his work, but I think we might produce a document that would have something like twenty points of agreement in it—a very comprehensive document. We are not out for small things. We are out for a document which will establish peace, as well as agree to naval ratios.

The British Premier Greets America

Prime Minister MacDonald Addresses American Press at Washington, October 4, 1929



HERE is one thing that is uppermost in my mind and I should like to express it to you straight-away. That is, I really am deeply moved by the magnificent reception that your people have given me since I landed in New York today.

Deeply Touched by Reception

It has been very touching to me and it is almost impossible for me to put into words how grateful I am for the warm as well as friendly reception which I have received all along the line of my route. I am sure that my daughter will say exactly the same tomorrow when she sees you.

Of course this is not my first visit to America. I always knew that your people were warm-hearted, but the proof they gave me today has been very touching indeed and I think that the people of Great Britain when they read about it will understand and appreciate it. They will know that it means that the reception given to me was really a reception given to them through me as their representative.

I would like to assure you on another point. That is that I am here especially, do believe me, my American friends, I am here not as a party leader at all, I am here as representing the whole body of public opinion in Great Britain. Their desire for cordial friendship with your people is very great and very profound and they are praying, they have been praying for weeks since they knew that this visit was likely to take place, that a way might be found to bring them in heart and in spirit closer and closer to your people here.

Anglo-American Alliance Not Considered

Do not make any misunderstanding about that because I see that sometimes it is said elsewhere that either one or other of us have the idea of coming to an alliance. There is no idea of alliances. None whatever.

America is blessed beyond words in occupying such a special position that she does not require to consider anything in the nature of an alliance. Alliances belong, as I said in New York today, to the old order of diplomacy.

What we want, and I believe what your people have shown that you want, is just understanding, and I might appeal to the American press, I should appeal to them in this way. You have a tremendous power in your hands to remove misunderstanding.

We don't always see eye to eye and I dare say you often find admirable reason for criticising us and for disagreeing with us, and all that I put in a plea for is that disagreement never be aggravated by misunderstanding.

Misunderstanding Root of Troubles

The trouble in the world today, everybody who has been foreign secretary, and who has been concerned with foreign relations, will tell you, the trouble is misunderstanding, and the great purpose, the main purpose, of my visit to Washington at the present moment, is that I am to

try and make misunderstanding impossible. I do not know if I can say anything in addition to that which would be very profitable at the present moment.

Neither your President, I believe, nor myself—I can certainly talk for myself—have any idea of spending much time in discussing details. We should like to survey together the large and wide, the high and deep problems of international peace.

We have had our experiences of international war. We have all taken risks in the making of war and in the going into wars. Isn't it time, my friends, that we should take some risks to secure peace?

As long as we think of peace in terms of war, we will never get peace. As soon as we think of international dangers in terms of peace and with the determination to maintain peace, then I have got the belief and the faith that we shall maintain peace. There is nothing that is more inimical to a final establishment of peace than a mentality which assumes that you have got to prepare for a possible war.

Praises U. S. for Kellogg Pact

Now America has done the world a very great service in sponsoring the Kellogg pact. The pact of peace signed in Paris only a few months ago is one of the most substantial advances towards the establishment of peace that ever has been made, and for that Europe has to thank America.

Now why should we not go on? We have all signed this pact. We have declared that war no longer enters into our minds as a national policy. Shall we not all and always assume that it is going to be effective?

That is the whole problem of international affairs, to make the pact of peace not only something that is put on paper, not only something that is signed, but something that is actively influencing us and all international policy.

Another point, and probably the last point I need mention to you is—do not, in whatever you say about this, do not say anything that will give other nations cause for assuming that what we are doing is hostile in any shape or form to them. Nothing is further from our thoughts. Any contribution to the end that the United States and ourselves should think more in harmony is not meant to be, and must not be taken to be an attempt to leave out other nations. It is quite the opposite.

Would Embrace Other Nations Also

Nothing, I am sure, would please both of us more than that any successful removal of misunderstanding between America and Great Britain should be at once followed by removal of other misunderstandings with or between other nations. We have no exclusive ideas in mind at all.

I think that is sufficient to give you a general idea of what we hope to do. I hope that as a result of our conversations there will be a warmer and still more cordial relationship between our two countries, and if that happens, I shall go back a very contented and a very happy man.

England Calls a Conference for Further Naval Limitations

Secretary Henderson's Note to Ambassador Dawes

Following is the text of a note delivered by the British Government to U. S. Ambassador Dawes on Monday, October 7, 1929, signed by Mr. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

HAVE the honor to transmit to Your Excellency herewith copies of the notes which I am today addressing to the French, Italian and Japanese Ambassadors in London inviting the French, Italian and Japanese Governments to participate in a Five Power Conference to deal with the question of naval disarmament, which it is pro-

posed to hold in London in the latter part of January next.

Two. As I understand that the Government of the United States concur in the terms of the enclosed notes, I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will be so good as to confirm my impression that they will find it possible to participate in the conference above mentioned.

Official Text of British Note

Following is the text of identic notes, signed by Mr. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, delivered by the British Government to the French, Italian and Japanese Ambassadors in London on Monday, October 7, 1929:

HAVE the honor to inform Your Excellency that the informal conversations on the subject of naval disarmament which have been proceeding in London during the last three months between the Prime Minister and the Ambassador of the United States have now reached a stage at which it is possible to say that there is no point outstanding of such serious importance as to prevent an agreement.

From time to time the Prime Minister has notified Your Excellency of the progress made in these discussions and I now have the honor to state that provisional and informal agreement has been reached on the following principles:

One. The conversations have been one of the results of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris in 1928 which brought about a realignment of our national attitudes on the subject of security in consequence of the provision that war should not be used as an instrument of national policy in the relations of nations one to another. Therefore the Peace Pact has been regarded as the starting point of agreement.

Two. It has been agreed to adopt the principle of parity in each of the several categories and that such parity shall be reached by December 31st, 1936. Consultation between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Government in the Dominions has taken place and it is contemplated that the program of parity on the British side should be related to naval forces of all parts of the Empire.

Three. The question of battleship strength was also touched upon during the conversations and it has been agreed in these conversations that subject to the assent of other signatory powers it would be desirable to reconsider the battleship replacement programs provided for in the Washington Treaty of 1922 with the view of diminishing the amount of replacement construction implied under that treaty.

Four. Since both the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the attitude that they have publicly adopted in regard to the desirability of securing the total abolition of the submarine, this matter hardly gave rise to discussion during the recent conversations. They recognize, however, that no final settlement on this subject can be reached except in conference with the other naval powers. (See Art. XXI of the Washington Naval Conference below.)

In view of the scope of these discussions both Governments consider it most desirable that a Conference should be summoned to consider the categories not covered by the Washington Treaty and to arrange for and deal with the questions covered by the second paragraph of Article 21 of that Treaty. It is our earnest hope that the Government will agree to the desirability of such a Conference. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States are in accord that such a Conference should be held in London at the beginning of the third week of January, 1930, and it is hoped that the Government will be willing to appoint representatives to attend it.

A similar invitation is being addressed to the Governments of _____ and the United States and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions are being asked to appoint representatives to take part in the Conference. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would cause the above invitation to be addressed to the _____ Government.

In the same way as the two Governments have kept Your Excellency informally *au courant* of the recent discussions, so now His Majesty's Government will be willing, in the interval before the proposed conference, to continue informal conversations with Your Excellency on any points which may require elucidation. The importance of reviewing the whole naval situation at an early date is so vital in the interests of general disarmament

that I trust that Your Excellency's Government will see their way to accept this invitation and that the date proposed will be agreeable to them.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to communicate to you in due course their views as to the subjects which they think should be discussed at the Conference, and will be glad to receive a corresponding communication from the ——— Government.

It is hoped that at this Conference the principal naval powers may be successful in reaching agreement. I should like to emphasize that His Majesty's Government have discovered no inclination in any quarter to set up new machinery for dealing with the naval disarmament question; on the contrary, it is hoped that by this means a text can be elaborated which will facilitate the task of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission and of the subsequent general disarmament conference.

Text of Article XXI of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922

IF during the term of the present Treaty the requirements of the national security of any contracting Power in respect of naval defense are, in the opinion of that Power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at the request of such Power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the Treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other Contracting Powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting Powers, which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the present Treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the Treaty may be necessary to meet such developments.

America Accepts Invitation to London Parley

On October 10 Secretary of State Stimson Sent the Following Reply to the Invitation of the British Government for a Naval Limitation Conference in London in January, 1930:

IHAVE the honor to refer to the note which you were good enough to address to the Ambassador on October 7, and I take great pleasure in informing you that the American Government hastens to accept the invitation of His Majesty's Government to a conference on Naval Armaments to take place in London the latter part of January, which will unite the powers signatory to the Washington Treaty in a discussion which will anticipate

the problems raised under Article 21 of that treaty, as well as broaden its scope by the inclusion of the other categories of ships.

Article 21 of the Washington Treaty, to which the note refers, provides for the calling of a naval conference at the request of any of the signatories for purposes of revising or extending the compact at any time prior to the 1931 date specified in the treaty for a conference to consider the naval question again.

Technical Problems to be Faced At the Coming London Conference

by RICHARD V. OULAHAN

Washington Correspondent, the New York Times



THE so-called "conversations" between the United States and Great Britain with a view to assembling a naval disarmament conference have now reached the point where certain fundamental principles have been agreed to, and details necessary to guide the conference in drafting a disarmament treaty are being worked out with every assurance that differences will be harmonized.

Fundamental Principles Outlined

The fundamental principles established or likely to be established may be set forth as follows:

1. Basing a naval disarmament agreement on the pledge of the Kellogg pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and linking this pledge with the projected agreement to curtail naval strength.
2. Maintaining parity between the United States and Great Britain in all classes of warships.

Actual Reduction Aimed At

3. Actual reduction of armaments and not merely upward limitation of armaments.
4. Reduction gradually over a term of years by failing to replace warships reaching the age limit, failing to continue work on vessels actually under construction, and in not carrying out parts at least, of building programs appropriated for or authorized.
5. Lengthening the age limit within which naval vessels may not be replaced by new tonnage.

Limitation of Destroyer Tonnage

6. Probably fixing a gross tonnage limitation on destroyers and submarines and leaving it discretionary with the signatory powers to build vessels within each class of the size and character desired, provided the gross tonnage fixed for each class is not exceeded.

7. Applying the so-called yardstick to cruiser measurement only.

The Cruiser Problem

8. Considering all cruisers as in one category, but perhaps differentiating, in applying the yardstick measurement, between cruisers capable of first-line offensive warfare and small cruisers chiefly, useful for policing the seas, otherwise commerce protectors.

There is some uncertainty on this point, but the apparent object is to give policy cruisers considerable discounts in the yardstick formula on account of their smaller guns, shorter range of gun fire, shorter steaming radius and lower speed.

Gun Limitation and Aged Ships

The effectiveness of one 10,000-ton cruiser with 8-inch guns against a group of small cruisers which could be

put out of commission by the larger vessel before their smaller calibred guns could become effective against it enters into consideration in this connection. Age of ships will be a factor of measuring cruisers by the yardstick.

The purpose of the yardstick is to establish the equivalent tonnage, otherwise the combatant effectiveness, of a cruiser, and not to measure cruisers by their displacement tonnage.

Limiting Increase by Categories

9. Permitting a small increase, probably 10 per cent, in the tonnage limitation fixed for any category of warships, but if this increase is applied the additional tonnage must be deducted from the tonnage limitation placed on some other category.

The diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Great Britain are preliminary merely to inviting France, Italy and Japan to participate in a five-power formal conference for naval armament reduction. The French Government, in inspired statements from Paris, has taken the wind out of rumors that France has decided to hold aloof from the projected armament gathering, as she and Italy did from the naval armament conference called by President Coolidge in 1927.

France, Italy and Japan

It is seen to be the earnest purpose of Britain and the United States to have France, Italy and Japan join the formal conference.

With all five naval powers ultimately agreeing to cut down their naval power and at the same time notifying the rest of the world that they are actuated in doing so by the spirit of the Kellogg pact, there is established a community of interests which will have deep significance.

Carrying Out the Kellogg Treaty Provisions

It is evident, however, that if the five naval powers agree to reduce their power of sea offensive, and in doing so reiterate the pledge embodied in the Kellogg treaty, they not only will set an example to the world but might give food for thought to any nation or group of nations which had aggressive intentions toward any one of the five governments included in the naval disarmament treaty.

A disarmament treaty based on the Kellogg pact would suggest a five-fold application of what frequently has been expressed with regard to two of their number—that "It is unthinkable that England and America will ever go to war with each other."


From the very outset of President Hoover's conception of another naval disarmament conference the idea of giving practical effect to the Kellogg pact through an international agreement to reduce the size of naval fleets has impregnated the situation.—*Extracts, see 4, pg. 256.*

Have States Outside League of Nations Impeded Disarmament?

Pro

SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA

Former Member of Secretariat, League of Nations

N our opinion the chief responsibility for the stagnant state of disarmament lies with the nations which remain outside the League. No amount of vituperation, invective or self-congratulation can alter the fact. The League is a courageous attempt at solving world problems in a world way and those who remain out of it are badly crippling this effort without contributing any positive alternative of a true constructive character.

We have heard many a so-called reason for the United States to remain outside. There is no reason whatsoever for such a thing. There are explanations of the fact. Of course, the fact is a fact, i. e., a link in a chain of events, the connection of which with preceding facts can be more or less intelligently described. But though the fact may be explained, the act cannot be justified.

Unfortunately, the people of the United States have but few opportunities to hear a straightforward statement of the position. The immense majority of them honestly think that the United States is the only peace-loving nation with decent standards of international life. Few realize that their nation bears perhaps the heaviest responsibility for the slow development of international peace. Their absence from the League would suffice to justify this statement. It is sometimes argued on their behalf that they co-operate in nearly all its activities. The observation is correct but irrelevant for the main point is not movement, work, activity; it is trust, confidence, moral tone. And what is wanted is not merely that the United States should be represented at all the League commissions, but that it should assume all the League obligations. The issue has been befogged both by well-meaning fools and by ill-meaning knaves with an argument representing Europe as anxious to entangle America in European wars. "Europe wants your boys again." Such an argument leaves us cold. We at any rate want no American Boys to come to Europe. We should be delighted if they stayed at home. We should be even delighted if they declined to go to Nicaragua. Our wish is that American boys should not go to war at all in any continent whatsoever. For it is all very well to speak of European politics as squabbles, intrigues and wars. But Europe through the League has salvaged country after country, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Dantzic, without inflicting any loss of sovereignty on them, any humiliation, any marines, any leases for naval bases; and had a European nation carried out on another European nation exactly the policy which the United States have carried out in more than one Central American country there would have been a grave European war. The reason why the American continent is peaceful is not that the United States have succeeded in maintaining a higher level of international politics in it than in Europe, but that the United States, being incomparably stronger than any other of the American nations, have been free to develop whatever policy

(Continued on next page)

Con

RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL

Research Expert, Foreign Policy Association

THREE times within the past eight years the United States has startled the world with proposals to disarm. It was out of a clear sky on that memorable day of Nov. 12, 1921, that Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes challenged the powers at the Washington conference to send to the bottom of the sea seventy warships built or building, having a total of about 1,650,000 tons. It was a challenge that they accepted. The United States made the greatest sacrifice by scrapping thirty-two ships.

A second effort to disarm was made when, in June, 1927, President Coolidge called a new naval conference at Geneva, Hugh Gibson headed our delegation there; but the result was a stalemate.

Once again the world was startled by American initiative when only last Monday, before a League commission at Geneva, Ambassador Gibson made a conciliatory plea to bring to an end the naval deadlock in which the great powers find themselves.

Will Mr. Gibson and his colleagues from other nations succeed in 1929 where they failed in 1927? This is the question which the Geneva meeting is attempting to decide. The one outstanding event between these two years, which may give to the present conference the air of real confidence and good-will, so essential to understanding, is the conclusion of the Kellogg anti-war pact.

That agreement was signed in Paris, on Aug. 27, 1928. In it the powers of the world have solemnly promised to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and never to seek the settlement of disputes except by pacific means. On April 22, 1929, Mr. Gibson said:

"Since our last meeting, the nations of the world have bound themselves by solemn understanding to renounce war. We believe (and we hope that our belief is shared by the other nations) that this agreement affirming humanity's will to peace will advance the cause of disarmament by removing doubts and fears which in the past have constituted our principal obstacle."

He declared that President Hoover felt that "the pact for the renunciation of war opens to us an unprecedented opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament, an opportunity which admits of no postponement."

It would be misleading to believe that nations have failed to disarm purely because of aggressive motives. No nation desires to make sacrifices which other nations do not assume. And the great problem in naval disarmament is in working out a formula by which the strength of navies can be measured.

Despite the complexity of the program, great progress has already been made. In 1921 the Washington conference brought about an agreement limiting the battleships of the British Empire, the United States, Japan, France and Italy, according to the ratio of 5-5-3, 1.67-1.67. In other words, the battleships of Great Britain and the United States were placed on a basis of equality.

In accepting this principle Great Britain surrendered

(Continued on next page)

Pro

SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA—Continued
Former Member of Secretariat, League of Nations

high or low they wish, without fear of endangering the peace of the continent.

The obligations which we want America to assume are not therefore so much those of Article 16 as those of Article 10. It is not that we want her as an ally in Europe; we want her as a peaceful nation in America. We do not want her to strengthen League armies for League wars; we want her to strengthen the League's peace by bowing before the Covenant and submitting to the courts.

Nor do we wish in any way either to imperil her material prosperity or to impair her moral prestige. Far from it. The only obstacle to her admirable commercial expansion is the deep mistrust which owing to her imperialistic isolation she is fostering everywhere and particularly in South America; and as to moral prestige she would regain the summits—the highest in her history—which she reached in 1919 if she came forward with truly imaginative proposals for world peace and disarmament.

The responsibility of America is therefore due to the fact that she gives the world a lesson of unlimited and irresponsible sovereignty every day. She does not accept the Court except under her own conditions which fifty-five other nations consider inadmissible; she does not arbitrate except in a few cases and when her Senate has carefully defined the issue; she does not join the League but picks and chooses whichever points she wishes for co-operation according to her own ideals, wishes, whims or interests; she ignores the Covenant and brings forward an alternative scheme as if the ten years of work done by practically the whole of the remaining nations had been the futile cackle of hens. This attitude of "take it or leave it" which America takes whether for arming or disarming, whether for arbitration or for refusing to arbitrate, whether for defining the Monroe Doctrine or for laying down a no-entanglement policy, this feudal ring which is still to be heard in her voice is the true obstacle on our path. Our American friends do not seem to realize that, in the words of a French poet, the way a gift is given is worth more than the gift, so that such a thing as the Kellogg Pact, ostensibly an act of co-operation, was put to the world in an uncompromising attitude which was deeply un-co-operative, thus destroying by its spirit what its letter meant to convey.

The whole position must be revised from the very beginning if we want true progress in disarmament. I am not—never was—of the opinion that America may be made to glide into the League in a kind of absent-minded way. I hold that the American people must face the issue squarely; that it must realize on the one hand the immense gravity of its responsibility while it remains outside, on the other the full meaning of its obligations if it joins. I believe that the very breadth and difficulty of the true position once it is put squarely before the American nation is of a kind to appeal to its imagination. The American people has a remarkable psychology, a mobility amounting almost to fluidity; a genuine desire for what is good; an enterprising, an almost adventurous spirit ready to experiment with new ideas; and finally a readiness to be led. That is why, though in my opinion the United States is the blackest obstacle on the path towards Disarmament, I believe it to be also our brightest hope.—*Extracts, see 5, pg. 256.*

Con

RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL—Continued
Research Expert, Foreign Policy Association

her historic principle of command of the sea, while the United States surrendered her 1916 shipbuilding program that would have given her the largest navy in the world.

Unfortunately, the Washington conference was not able to limit cruisers—vessels which are lighter and faster than battleships. And following this conference the United States Navy Department pointed out that the American Navy was much inferior to other navies in cruisers, and that, to put our fleet upon a basis of equality with the British fleet, the construction of twenty-one large cruisers was necessary.

Nevertheless, Congress held back from making appropriations for the cruisers in the hope that a new arms conference would be held. The desire for such a conference was manifested in the naval appropriation bills of 1923, 1924 and 1925. Following the Washington conference, the United States had only ten modern cruisers; these were of the Omaha class of 7,500 tons, and carried six-inch guns. Nevertheless, in 1924, Congress authorized the construction of eight 10,000-ton eight-inch gun cruisers.

Although the United States withheld cruiser appropriations immediately after the Washington conference, other governments adopted extensive building programs in the vessels unlimited at Washington. In 1922-23 the lead was taken by Japan and France, and in August, 1925, the Conservative government in Britain adopted the so-called Birkenhead program, which called for the construction within five years of sixteen cruisers, nine of which were to be 10,000-ton vessels. Just before the Geneva conference Britain had built or building fifty-four modern cruisers in comparison with eighteen for the United States.

Meanwhile the League of Nations had tackled the armament problem as a whole. Article VIII of the Covenant obliged members of the League to bring about the "reduction of national armament to the lowest point consistent with national safety."

After various preliminary efforts, the League set up in 1920 a Preparatory Commission for a disarmament conference, and the United States accepted an invitation to participate in its work. Between 1925 and 1927 this body held three sessions, during which vital differences arose between two main groups.

A deadlock was finally reached, and in February, 1927, President Coolidge suddenly issued a call for a naval conference in the hope that the naval question might be settled apart from the land and air questions also being discussed by the League commission. France and Italy, however, declined his invitation, partly on the ground that it meant taking the matter out of the hands of the League. Nevertheless, Britain, the United States and Japan assembled at Geneva in June, 1927, for the purpose of agreeing upon cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

Vast and complex as the ramifications of the problem are, the stand of the United States at Geneva has given new life to the international disarmament movements. President Hoover has already announced to the world that the United States takes the Kellogg pact seriously, and that it is not hypocritical in its demands for peace. He has undertaken his first major international task with characteristic directness.—*Extracts, see 6, pg. 256.*

Do Naval Officers Obstruct Reduction?

Pro

HON. JAMES V. MCCLINTIC
U. S. Representative, Oklahoma, Democrat



HERE are two distinct classes of citizens in this Nation: Those that can see a war cloud in the middle of every sunshiny day and who continuously try to take advantage of every opportunity to involve this country in great expenditures for the kind of preparedness that is believed by many to be useless in time of war; and secondly, the class who take into consideration the economic and financial conditions of this country and the various nations of the world, keeping in mind that the ultimate object of all of the best citizens should be the maintenance of peace with other nations, also keeping in mind that should the Nation be so unfortunate as to become involved in a war that the kind of preparedness we should have would be the newer, more modern kinds of defense that any nation will need to be victorious.

Admiral Jones has just testified before the Naval Affairs Committee that another disarmament conference will be held in three years, at which all five of the world powers will be represented. If this Nation starts the construction of a program costing more than a billion dollars, we will be in the same attitude as we were in 1922, when it was necessary to scrap nearly \$300,000,000 worth of new ships in order to bring about a disarmament agreement.

There are approximately 600 naval officers in Washington; and all of these officers desire at some time to command a great, big, fine ship that has lovely and luxurious quarters. If I were in the Navy, to be perfectly fair and frank about it, I would want the same thing.

It is known that the Navy already prepares practically all of the bills they desire enacted into law which relate to departmental matters. These are either given to the chairman or some member of the committee, who introduces same on the floor of the House; then they go back to the clerk of the committee, who refers them to the same course from which they originated, and a report is made. In many times the report is prepared ahead of the time the bill is introduced. Therefore, according to the present procedure, practically no legislation can be enacted into law without the indorsement of the Navy for the reason the officers in charge of this great bureau have practically a strangle hold on the functions of the committee having jurisdiction over this subject. At the present time this Government suffers from too much bureaucratic control, and it is growing worse.

Many students of the Geneva conference are of the opinion that an agreement could have been reached if the United States had agreed to put 6-inch guns on the new type of cruiser desired. However, when it is known that the Navy kept Admiral Jones in England off and on for a period of two years in conference with certain naval officers and that all naval officers are against the reduction of ships, it can be easily understood why the disarmament conference at Geneva was the most successfully concluded of any ever held, from the standpoint of the officers in the Navy.—*Extracts, see 7, pg. 256.*

Con

ADMIRAL HILARY P. JONES
Delegate, Geneva Arms Conference, 1927



HERE seems to be a very widespread opinion in our country that naval officers are fundamentally opposed to any movement looking to the reduction and limitation of armaments. Such an attitude of mind on the part of the general public is wholly unjust to naval officers, and tends to discredit us in our earnest efforts to keep our national defense forces at the level that we honestly consider absolutely necessary for national security.

Nevertheless, we are anxious that that level shall be fixed by international agreement at the lowest point compatible with safety. We would be grossly negligent of our duty if we did not keep in mind always the defense of our country and its enormous commercial interests spread all over the seven seas, interests which now equal and soon will surpass those of other nations. We have an inalienable right to parity in naval armaments with the strongest sea power in order that we may not be placed in a position of inferiority to any nation.

With the sympathetic help and cooperation of my naval associates, I have worked unceasingly since the first meeting of the preparatory commission for the disarmament conference held in Geneva in 1926, to find some fair basis of agreement for the limitation of armaments, and I am sure that I am speaking the mind of all thinking naval officers when I say that the navy desires a limitation that will be equitable to all concerned and will not jeopardize what we consider absolutely necessary to our national defense.

I resent very much the term Big Navy Advocates as applied to naval officers and also to those members of Congress who are sincerely solicitous for the defense of our national interests. I am opposed to great armaments because I do not believe that the taxpayers of the world should be burdened with the expense of building up and maintaining armaments beyond the minimum necessity to national security. Furthermore, I am convinced that competition in armaments tends to create suspicion and uneasiness in the world and thereby helps to bring on war.

It must always be remembered, however, that there is a minimum below which we cannot afford to go because our geographical position imposes upon us the necessity of carrying on operations in far distant waters. If we should go below that minimum we would be unable to keep any vessels operating in those distant areas. Above that irreducible minimum the question of the relative strength of naval armaments becomes a matter for consideration and agreement.

At the Geneva Conference in 1927, as a result of the studies of the Navy, our delegation proposed a comparatively low level of naval armaments and further stated that the United States would be willing to go as low as the most powerful nation on the sea would agree to go. Since that conference the Navy has not changed its attitude of mind and is still anxious that some agreement for a limitation of naval armaments may be reached, but the navy insists that our right to equality with the strongest sea power, in fact as well as in principle, shall be recognized as a *sine qua non* of such agreement.—*Extracts, see 8, pg. 256.*

Will Parity Lead to Reduction?

Pro

HON. KENNETH MCKELLAR
U. S. Senator, Tennessee, Democrat



Four representatives and the representatives of Great Britain are able to reach an agreement or accord by which the British Navy and the American Navy can be made absolutely equal, I shall be very glad to vote to ratify such a treaty. On the other hand, if such an agreement gives to Great Britain a superiority in cruisers or other naval forces, as a Senator of the United States I shall vote and work against the ratification of such a treaty. I am an earnest advocate of peace; my entire record since I have been in the Congress has shown that I am; but I do not believe that an inferior navy for America will make peace in the world.

Because of our extended coast line; because of our far-flung possessions all over the world; because of our trade and commerce on all the seas, now greater than any other nation's; because of our great wealth, sometimes estimated as being 65 per cent of the wealth of the world; because many nations owe us large sums; because of our desire for peace and good will with all peoples and all nations, there never was a worse time for us to have an inferior navy than right now. Why hamstring our Navy and thus make our influence for good and peace in the world of little value?

A sound naval policy for this country is to build a navy as large as our needs call for, unfettered and unhampered by any agreement. In my judgment, the best possible thing for America to do is to cancel the agreement of 1922 when it expires in 1936, and for the present make no other agreement.

By reason of her trade and commerce, by reason of her interests all over the world, by reason of her desire for peace, America should not be put in a position of inferiority on the seas and I shall not vote to put her in such a position.

The naval disarmament agreement of 1924 left her in a pitiful state of inferiority, and when that agreement expires in 1930 it should not be renewed. That agreement, in my judgment, was the most flagrant sacrifice of American rights that ever took place in our history, and it should not be enlarged or extended, but should be annulled at the earliest possible moment.

If President Hoover can secure an agreement that will give us absolute equality with Great Britain in every essential, I will be the first to applaud, but anything less I shall oppose. Our navy must be as strong as Great Britain's. The idea of our fighting a war with Great Britain is wholly beside the question and unthinkable. It has no place in this discussion.

But I can never bring myself to aid in putting my country in a place of inferiority in naval affairs. I am not a big navy man. I am for peace and I know the cause of peace will be best conserved by America enlarging her influence and not diminishing it. I know that a position of naval inferiority for America will not make for world peace.—*Extracts, See 7, pg. 256.*

Con

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
President Columbia University



As a sequel to the signing and ratification of the Pact of Paris (the Outlawry of War Treaty), reduction of naval armaments, particularly on the part of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, becomes a matter of pressing importance and of high moral consequence. The argument by which these great and growing navies have been sustained is that they were needed to protect the seaborne commerce of the nations in question as well as to defend the national security. Whatever it may have been possible to say for or against this argument in the past, it now falls completely to the ground unless the governments signatory to the Pact of Paris suspect each its own sincerity or distrust that of their co-signatories. The Pact of Paris either means something or is empty rhetoric. If it be but empty rhetoric then it is a cruel and wicked deception of civilized mankind by a group of intriguing personalities temporarily clothed with the power of public office and false to their trust. If it means something, then that something must promptly be manifested, not by declarations in words but by formulations of policies in acts. If the Pact of Paris means something, then there is no longer any seaborne commerce to be protected, since the whole world has pledged itself not to attack. If the Pact of Paris means something, then there is no longer national security to be defended, since the whole world has pledged itself not to put it in peril. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that national honor and national truthfulness demand that the navies of tomorrow be navies of police, to consist of cruisers for police work, for sea patrol and for those hundred and one acts of courtesy, humanity, and kindness which are happily possible in the life of modern nations.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has large seaborne commerce. What navy is there to protect that commerce? The Kingdom of Denmark has large seaborne commerce. What navy is there to protect that? The Kingdom of Norway has large seaborne commerce. What navy is there to protect that? The fact is that this whole argument is a sham unless it conceal the fact that there is military rivalry for advantage between two or more nations. It is that fact which is to be dragged out where men can see it and killed by the bright light of national honor, national truthfulness, and national sincerity.

It can hardly be expected that in the discussion of these difficult and delicate matters no project will be brought forward, even in the best of faith, which will be found acceptable by every other government which is a party to a given international conference. Open-mindedness, however, and freedom from unkind and ungenerous suspicion are as essential in formal international intercourse as they are in the private life of gentlemen.

The conviction may again be recorded that little progress will be made toward the most desirable limitation of naval armament until those who are deputed to carry forward the official negotiations and discussions

Continued on page 250

Pro

PROVIDENCE (R. I.) TRIBUNE
Editorial



HE announcement by Secretary of State Stimson that an agreement with Great Britain concerning naval armaments has almost been reached and that a conference to be called in a short while will straighten out the unfinished business is good news. After the fiasco of Geneva and the delays and disappointments in the meantime it strikes happily upon the ears of both interested nations.

But it is wise not to let optimism run away with reality. The United States Navy is not to be scrapped overnight and our coast is not to be left defenceless to the attack of a possible enemy. On the other hand, Britain is not to reduce her fleet materially. Those who favor complete disarmament will probably be disappointed at the terms agreed upon.

The important fact about the coming agreement is that two great nations, each with mighty navies, have decided to be sensible about the whole matter of armaments. Unless some understood policy was arrived at, there would be no telling where naval construction would lead to. And once the United States started to build, Great Britain would be forced to build also, and from the competitive programs would develop suspicion and its attendant evils, fear and ill-will. Had Germany and Great Britain sat around a conference table in 1910 as the United States and Great Britain now plan to do, one of the sources of the last war would have been eliminated.

Both the United States and Great Britain will protect their national interests through an adequate navy. But they will not place exorbitant burdens upon their nationals in taxation to meet the demands of jingoists and rampant patriots. In an age where efficiency is the catchword and peace is the great desire so that people can work in peace and happiness and untroubled by fears and suspicions, the natural thing for two nations, potentially rivals on the seas, is to sit down together and ask why all the pother, fuss and expense. And having asked that question they have started on the right road. For the right answer is obvious to any sensible man.

The work of Hoover, Dawes and Stimson and MacDonald is but a beginning. It is as important psychologically as it is materially. Out of it is bound to come good feelings. At the same time both countries will save millions of dollars. It will lead to greater things in the future.

Pro

BROOKLYN TIMES
Editorial



HERE can be no doubt of the world-wide importance of the agreement in principle between the two greatest naval powers. Its principal significance is that it means a limit to the building of warships. Along the lines of the policy now to be abandoned by the United States and Great Britain, warship after warship would have been added to the fleet as each power tried to build ship for ship and gun for gun against the other. The imposition of vast taxes would have been the economic entail. The disgust and enmity of poorer nations would have been a collateral result. There is no foreseeing what endless mischief might have eventuated.

That this is all to be avoided is highly to the credit of Mr. Hoover and Mr. MacDonald.

Con

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER—Continued

turn their backs once and for all upon the discarded past and face the realities of the present and of the future. The Pact of Paris solemnly renounces war as an instrument of national policy. There is, therefore, no reason why the naval strength of any given nation should be as great as, or greater than, the naval strength of any other nation.

Cities and towns adjust the size and the character of their several police forces to the demonstrated needs of their own patrol and relief work. They do not stop to inquire just what may be the size or composition of the police force of some other city or town whether at home or abroad. Each community minds its own police business in its own best way and does not drill or arm its police to defend or protect it against any contemplated assault by the police of its neighbor. The Pact of Paris, if sincere and honest, brings just this situation into existence as between civilized nations. Each one of these should now be able to organize and equip its own police force, whether on land or sea, from its own point of view alone and without any reference whatever to the size and character of any other national police force.

All formulas of parity and of proportionate development of navies are out of date. They mean nothing unless it is still proposed, in the face of the Pact of Paris, to use these navies for some form of international war. The people of the United States have solved the problem of armament so far as concerns their army. It now remains for them quickly to solve this problem so far as concerns their navy. Let it be the American people which in these modern days first proclaims and illustrates Peace on Earth, Good Will toward Men!—*Extracts, See 10, pg. 256.*

Con

HON. WILLIAM E. BORAH
U. S. Senator, Idaho, Republican



PARITY, coupled with reduction means much, means a great deal, but parity, coupled merely with limitation means very little.

If I understand the report of our Navy Department correctly, Great Britain now has fifty-nine modern cruisers, built or building, a tonnage of 375,300. We now have eighteen modern cruisers, built or building.

If Great Britain will follow our example at the Washington conference and sink some of her ships, and thus come to parity, it will not only save the taxpayer but reduce the incentive to war—for huge armaments are always an incentive to war, parity or no parity.

But if we have to build up to parity, it vastly increases the burdens of the taxpayer and augments the incentive to war.

What we desire, I suppose, really is a reduction of armaments; that is the primary thing for which we are contending. If parity were used to justify the building of huge armaments, it would become a menace instead of a security.

I notice from the dispatches from London that Great Britain will not reduce her cruisers. That is very discouraging news.—*Extracts, See 11, pg. 256.*

The Bagot-Rush Correspondence

Continued from page 231

State and himself upon the subject of a proposal to reduce the naval force of the two countries upon the American Lakes, he had received the commands of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent to inform this Government that His Royal Highness was willing to accede to the proposition made by the Secretary of State in his note of the 2nd of August last.

The Undersigned has the honour to express to Mr. Bagot the satisfaction which The President feels at His Royal Highness The Prince Regent's having acceded to the proposition of this Government as contained in the note alluded to. And in further answer to Mr. Bagot's note, the Undersigned, by direction of The President, has the honour to state, that this Government, cherishing the same sentiments expressed in the note of the 2nd of August, agrees, that the naval force to be maintained upon the Lakes by the United States and Great Britain shall, henceforth, be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is:

On Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding One Hundred Tons burden, and armed with one eighteen-

pound cannon. On the Upper Lakes to two vessels not exceeding the like burden each, and armed with like force, and on the waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel not exceeding like burden and armed with like force.

And it agrees, that all other armed vessels on these Lakes shall be forthwith dismantled and that no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed. And it further agrees, that if either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

The Undersigned is also directed by The President to state, that proper orders will be forthwith issued by this Government to restrict the naval force thus limited to such services as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.

The Undersigned eagerly avails himself of this opportunity to tender to Mr. Bagot the assurances of his distinguished consideration and respect.

RICHARD RUSH.

President Monroe's Proclamation Announcing Boundary Agreement



HEREAS, an arrangement was entered into at the city of Washington, in the month of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, between Richard Rush, esquire, at that time acting as Secretary for the Department of State of the United States, for and in behalf of the Government of the United States, and the Right Honourable Charles Bagot, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, for and in behalf of His Britannic Majesty, which arrangement is in the words following, to wit:

"The naval force to be maintained upon the American Lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is:

"On Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen pound cannon.

"On the Upper Lakes, to two vessels not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force.

"On the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding like burden, and armed with like force.

"All other armed vessels on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed.

"If either party should be hereafter desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

"The naval force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as will in no respect, interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party."

And whereas the Senate of the United States have approved of the said arrangement, and recommended that it should be carried into effect, the same having also received the sanction of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Britannic Majesty.

Now, therefore, I, James Monroe, President of the United States, do, by this my proclamation, make known and declare that the arrangement aforesaid, and every stipulation thereof, has been duly entered into, concluded and confirmed, and is of full force and effect.

Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this twenty-eighth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, and of the independence of the United States the forty-second.

By the President:

JAMES MONROE.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
Secretary of State.

The 71st Congress

Duration of the 70th Congress, March 4, 1929-March 4, 1931

First, or "Special" Session, Convened April 15, 1929.

Second, or "Long" Session, Begins December 2, 1929.

In the Senate

Membership

Total—96

55 Republicans 39 Democrats

1 Farmer-Labor

1 Vacancy

Presiding Officer

President: Charles Curtis, R.

Vice-President of the United States

Floor Leaders

Majority Leader

James E. Watson, Ind., R.

Minority Leader

Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., D.

In the House

Membership

Total—435

267 Republicans 163 Democrats

1 Farmer-Labor

4 Vacancies

Presiding Officer

Speaker: Nicholas Longworth, R.

Member of the House from Ohio

Floor Leaders

Majority Leader

John Q. Tilson, Conn., R.

Minority Leader

John N. Garner, Tex., D.



The Coming Month in Congress

by Norborne T. N. Robinson



ITH an intense struggle over almost every phase of the Tariff Bill marking the debate on that measure since it reached the floor of the Senate, even the most optimistic among the leaders of both parties in the Senate are confessing their inability to make even an approximate prediction of how long the discussions will last.

Conservative Estimates Blasted

The most conservative estimates made when the tariff bill reached the Senate from the House in the early summer were that the bill would be brought to final passage by late October. Unforeseen events, however, have proven that these predictions, characterized at the time by optimistic Senators as being the height of pessimism, have proven more than true.

House Recesses May Be Extended

The last "gentlemen's agreement" reached in the House

was for three day adjournments until October 24, when, according to this arrangement, the House is to come back in full force. Now there is a feeling among House leaders that the period covered by the agreement will be extended until some time in November, so impossible does it appear that the Senate will have a final vote on the Tariff Bill before November.

Senate Investigations

In the meantime several events have occurred which have started the Senate to work on special investigations.

The subcommittee of the Senate Committee in Naval Affairs investigating alleged propaganda against naval reductions is in full swing. Resolutions have been adopted by the Senate ordering a general investigation into all types of lobbying and for an investigation of the sale of Government owned merchant vessels by the United States Shipping Board, but definite plans for these inquiries have not taken shape as the DIGEST goes to press.

Action Taken by Congress

A Daily Summary of the Proceedings of the House and Senate June 20 to September 26, 1929.

Note—This department contains a record of action on the floor of the House and the Senate. By following it from month to month the reader obtains a compact but complete review of the work actually done by Congress throughout the session. The principal abbreviations used are the following: H. R. means House bill; H. Res. means House Resolution; H. J. Res. means House Joint Resolution; H. Con. Res. means House Concurrent Resolution; S. means Senate Bill; S. Res., Senate Resolution; S. J. Res., Senate Joint Resolution, and S. Con. Res., Senate Concurrent Resolution. If reference is made to the consideration or action by the Senate of a House bill or resolution, it means that the House has passed it and sent it to the Senate, and vice versa.

Monday, August 19, 1929

Senate:

Vice President Charles Curtis called the Senate to order.
Rev. George G. Culbertson, Associate Minister of the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church offered prayer.
By unanimous consent dispensed with the reading of the Journal.
Adjourned until Thursday, August 22, 1929.

Thursday, August 22, 1929

Senate:

The Senate opened with Rev. Culbertson offering the prayer.
By unanimous consent dispensed with reading of the Journal.
Adjourned until Monday, August 26, 1929.

Monday, August 26, 1929

Senate:

Mr. McKellar, Tenn., D., announced the death of Hon. Lawrence D. Tyson, United States Senator from Tennessee.
Adjourned until Wednesday, August 28, 1929, out of respect to Mr. Tyson.

Wednesday, August 28, 1929

Senate:

By unanimous consent dispensed with the reading of the Journal.
Adjourned until Saturday, August 31, 1929.

Saturday, August 31, 1929

Senate:

Rev. George G. Culbertson offered prayer.
By unanimous consent dispensed with the reading of the Journal.
Adjourned until Wednesday, September 4, 1929.

Wednesday, September 4, 1929

Senate:

The roll was called and sixty-nine Senators answered to their name.
Mr. Ashurst, Ariz., D., presented the resolutions adopted by the American Legion, Department of Arizona, at its Eleventh Annual Convention.
Mr. Smoot, Utah, R., reported back favorably with amendments H. R. 2667 to provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States and to protect American labor.
Executive session.
Adjourned.

Thursday, September 5, 1929

Senate:

Mr. Simmons, N. C., D., introduced S. Res. 108, directing the Finance Committee of the Senate to obtain from the Treasury Department the financial conditions of taxpayers applying for tariff relief.

Discussed prohibition enforcement.

Adjourned until Monday, September 9, 1929.

September 9, 1929

Senate:

Mr. McKellar, Tenn., D., presented the certificate of appointment of the Hon. W. E. Brock, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the late Senator Tyson.
Continued debate on S. Res. 108, directing the Finance Committee of the Senate to secure income tax information from the Treasury in connection with H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Adjourned.

Tuesday, September 10, 1929

Senate:

Resumed debate on and agreed to, as modified by a vote of 51 to 27 (not voting, 17), S. Res. 108, directing the Finance Committee of the Senate to secure income tax information from the Treasury Department in connection with H. R. 2667 the Tariff Bill.
Messrs. Harrison, Miss., D., Couzens, Mich., R., Walsh, Mont., D., Walsh, Mass., D., Sackett, Ky., R., Edge, N. J., R., George, Ga., D., and many others spoke on the resolution.
Debated S. Res. 111, to deny Senator-elect William S. Vare, of Pennsylvania, a seat in the Senate.
Messrs. Watson, Ind., R., Norris, Nebr., R., Walsh, Mont., D., Glass, Va., D., and others spoke on the resolution.
Recessed.

Wednesday, September 11, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of S. Res. 111, declaring that William S. Vare, of Pennsylvania is not entitled to a seat in the Senate, from the State of Pennsylvania.
Messrs. Reed, Pa., R., Pittman, Nev., D., Waterman, Col., R., and others spoke on the resolution.
It was agreed, by a vote of 41 to 34 (not voting, 20), to postpone further consideration of S. Res. 111, until December 3, 1929.
Debated H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Executive session.
Recessed.

Thursday, September 12, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the Tariff bill.
Messrs. Capper, Kan., R., Simmons, N. C., D., Smoot, Utah, R., George, Ga., D., Sackett, Ky., R., Brookhart, Iowa, R., King, Utah, D., Reed, Pa., R., and others spoke on the bill.
Mr. Schall, Minn., R., announced the death of Hon. O. J. Kvale, a member of the House of Representatives from Minnesota.
Recessed.

Friday, September 13, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.

Messrs. Harrison, Miss., D., King, Utah, D., Brookhart, Iowa, R., Reed, Pa., R., Walsh, Mont., D., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed.

Saturday, September 14, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Harrison, Miss., D., Smoot, Utah, D., Reed, Pa., R., Brookhart, Iowa, R., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed, until Monday, September 16, 1929.

Monday, September 16, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Walsh, Mass., D., Smoot, Utah, D., King, Utah, D., Fletcher, Fla., D., George, Ga., D., Borah, Idaho, R., Reed, Pa., R., Simmons, N. C., D., Barkley, Ky., D., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed.

Tuesday, September 17, 1929

Senate:

Began consideration of S. Res. 119, that the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce collect and make available all possible information as to the wrecks of airplanes engaged in Interstate Commerce in which lives have been lost.
Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. McKellar, Tenn., D., Walsh, Mass., D., King, Utah, D., George, Ga., D., Reed, Pa., R., Pittman, Nev., D., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed.

Wednesday, September 18, 1929

Senate:

Began consideration of S. Res. 113, directing the Senate Finance Committee to obtain from the Tariff Commission certain information in regard to H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. McMaster, S. D., R., Norris, Nebr., R., Robinson, Ark., D., Simmons, N. C., D., and others spoke on the resolution.
Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Fletcher, Fla., D., King, Utah, D., Shortridge, Calif., R., Robinson, Ark., D., Steiwer, Oreg., R., Heflin, Ala., D., and others spoke on the bill.
Executive session
Recessed.

Thursday, September 19, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Wagner, N. Y., D., Smoot, Utah, R., McKellar, Tenn., D., Thomas, Okla., D., Capper, Kans., R., Norris, Nebr., R., and others spoke on the bill.
Ratified the Geneva convention removing certain wartime restrictions on foreign trade imposed by various nations.
Continued debate on H. R. 2667, the tariff bill, and agreed to several amendments.
Recessed.

Friday, September 20, 1929

Senate:

Mr. Vandenberg, Mich., R., introduced a bill, S. 1726, to amend the Federal code covering contempt procedure.
Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the Tariff Bill.
Messrs. Harrison, Miss., D., Borah, Idaho, R., Watson, Ind., R., Frazier, N. Dak., R., Walsh, Mont., D., Wagner, N. Y., R.,

Sheppard, Tex., D., Swanson, Va., D., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed.

Saturday, September 21, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Mr. Dill, Wash., D., spoke on the allocation of radio channels.
Messrs. Howell, Nebr., R., Johnson, Calif., R., and others spoke on the tariff bill.
Recessed, until Monday, September 23, 1929.

Monday, September 23, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Blease, S. C., D., Walsh, Mass., D., Robinson, Ark., D., Simmons, N. C., D., Smoot, Utah, R., George, Ga., D., Reed, Pa., R., and others spoke on the bill.
Held memorial service for the late Lawrence D. Tyson, a former Senator from the State of Tennessee.
Mr. McKellar, Tenn., D., spoke on Naval Disarmament.
Recessed.

House:

Called to order by Clark of the House, William Tyler Page.
Representative Simmons, Nebr., R., presided.
No business was transacted.
Adjourned until noon, September 26, 1929.

Tuesday, September 24, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Simmons, N. C., D., Couzens, Mich., R., King, Utah, D., Reed, Pa., R., Glenn, Ill., R., Smoot, Utah, R., Harrison, Miss., D., and others spoke on the bill.
Discussed the prohibition enforcement problem.
Recessed.

House:

The House was not in session.

Wednesday, September 25, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667 the tariff bill.
Messrs. La Follette, Wis., R., George, Ga., D., King, Utah, D., Harrison, Miss., D., Bingham, Conn., R., Watson, Ind., R., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed.

House:

The House was not in session.

Thursday, September 26, 1929

Senate:

Resumed consideration of H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.
Messrs. Borah, Idaho, R., Reed, Pa., R., Fletcher, Fla., D., Walsh, Mont., D., Tydings, Md., D., McKellar, Tenn., D., Metcalf, R. I., R., and others spoke on the bill.
Recessed.

House:

Representative Edith Nourse Rogers, Mass., R., presided as Speaker pro tem, the first instance of a woman presiding officer for an entire session of the House.
Business was limited to invocation and reading of Journal.
Adjourned, until Monday, September 30, 1929.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

The White House Calendar

August 20 to September 26

Addresses

September 18—Radio address of President Hoover from the White House study, on the accomplishments of the radio.

Executive Orders

September 6—An executive order transferring to the Navy Department control and jurisdiction over a certain tract of land in the Canal Zone for the use of the Colon, Naval Radio Station, Colon, Panama.

September 11—An executive order amending orders of January 17th and 28th, 1873, to permit officers and employees of the Indian Service serving in a medical or sanitary capacity on part-time employment, with consent of the Secretary of the Interior to hold State, County or Municipal positions of like character.

September 11—An executive order prescribing rules and regulations for the administration of the Foreign Service of the United States.

September 16—An executive order abolishing Lewiston, N. Y., as a port of entry, Customs Collection District No. 9, at Buffalo.

September 16—An executive order extending the limits of the ports of Astoria, Longview, Portland and Marshfield, Customs Collection District, No. 29, Portland, Oregon.

Proclamations

August 26—A proclamation transferring and conveying to the people of Porto Rico all the rights, title and interest of the United States in a tract of land known as San Geronimo, being a portion of the San Juan Military Reservation, Porto Rico.

Important Civilian Appointments

September 4—John W. Garrett, of Maryland, to be Ambassador of the United States to Italy.

September 4—Garrit John Diekema, of Michigan, to be Envoy of the United States to the Netherlands.

September 4—George T. Summerlin, of Louisiana, to be Envoy of the United States to Venezuela.

September 4—William H. Beach, of Virginia; Culver B. Chamberlain, of Missouri; Samuel G. Ebling, of Ohio; Samuel Green, of Maryland; William F. Nason, of Massachusetts; J. Hall Paxton, of Virginia; C. Warwick Perkins, Jr., of Maryland; John S. Richardson, Jr., of Massachusetts; Robert B. Streeper, of Ohio; Arthur F. Tower, of New York; Richard R. Willey, of New York, and Whitney Young, of New York, to be consuls of the United States of America.

September 4—Elvin Seibert, of New York; Edward T. Wailes, of New York; John C. Shillock, Jr., of Oregon; J. Laurence Pond, of Connecticut; James W. Gantenbein, of Oregon; Claude H. Hall, Jr., of Maryland, and Sidney A. Belovsky, of New York, to be vice consuls of career of the United States of America.

September 4—Flavius J. Chapman, 3d, of Virginia; Julius C. Holmes, of Kansas; Alfred W. Kliefoth, of Pennsylvania, to be secretaries in the Diplomatic Service.

September 4—Alexander Legge, of Illinois, and Charles C. Teague, of California, to be members of the Federal Farm Board, for one year from June 15, 1929; William F. Schilling, of Minnesota, and Samuel Roy McKelvie, of Nebraska, to be members for two years from June 15, 1929; C. B. Denman, of Missouri, to be a member for three years from June 15, 1929; Charles S. Wilson, of New York, for a term of four years from June 15, 1929; James C. Stone, of Kentucky, to be a member for a term of five years from June 15, 1929; Carl Williams, of Oklahoma, to be a member for a term of six years from June 15, 1929; and Albert C. Williams, of Texas, to be a member for a term of eight years, expiring August 6, 1937.

September 9—Leland Harrison, of Illinois, to be Envoy to Uruguay.

September 9—Scott Wilson, of Maine, to be U. S. Circuit Judge, first circuit.

September 9—John Boyd Avis, of New Jersey; Mortimer W. Byers, of New York, and Albert L. Watson, of Pennsylvania, to be U. S. District Judges.

September 9—Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, to be Governor of Porto Rico.

September 9—Alf Oftedal, of California, to be collector of internal revenue for the first district of California.

September 16—Clarence M. Young, of Iowa, to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

September 16—William L. Cooper, of New York, to be Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

September 17—Harry F. Guggenheim, of New York, to be Ambassador of the United States to Cuba.

September 17—Samuel Reber, Jr., of New York, to be a secretary in the Diplomatic Service of the United States.

September 18—Wilburn P. Hughes, of Florida, to be U. S. Attorney, southern district of Florida.

Messages to Congress

September 26—A message from the President of the United States giving the date of the approval and signature of certain bills and resolutions.

The Month in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of the United States adjourned for the summer on June 3 until October 7, when the 1929 autumn term will begin. A report of the first important decision handed down after the Court reconvenes will be published in the November number of the Digest.

Sources from which Material in this Number is Taken

1. "Nine Years of the League of Nations, 1920-1928," (Ninth Yearbook of League).
2. Bulletin published by Peace Committee of Friends.
3. Foreign Policy Association Bulletin, January 6, 1928.
4. Special dispatch to the *New York Times*, September 1, 1929.
5. "Disarmament" by Salvador De Madariago.
6. *New York Times*, April 28, 1929.
7. *Congressional Record*, February 15, 1929.
8. Interview at Geneva Arms Conference on September 13, 1927.
9. *Congressional Record*, September 23, 1929.
10. International Conciliation Bulletin, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for December, 1928 and January, 1929.
11. Press Statement, September 16, 1929.

Statement of Ownership

(Required by Act of Congress, August 24, 1912)

Of THE CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, published monthly (except for months of July and August), at Washington, D. C., for April, 1928.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, City of Washington, personally appeared Alice Gram Robinson who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says she is the Editor, Publisher and Owner of THE CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, embodied in Section 443, Postal Laws and Regulations, to-wit:

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Alice Gram Robinson,

Signature of Editor, Publisher and Owner.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this first day of April, 1928.

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My commission expires March 18, 1930.

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